Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Elected Oligarchy and Economic Underdevelopment: The Case of Guyana

Khemraj, Tarron and Hinova, Diana (2011): Elected Oligarchy and Economic Underdevelopment: The Case of Guyana.

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Abstract

This study proposes the idea that Guyana’s present government can be categorized as an elected oligarchy. It highlights the existence of several binding constraints (or structural bottlenecks) and demonstrates how these constraints are exacerbated by the elected oligarchy to impair the economic development of the country. Using stylized data on economic trends, the paper illustrates the direct and indirect channels through which the elected oligarchy stifles the private sector and consequently economic progress. As such, the paper presents the elected oligarchy as an alternative channel through which private investments are crowded out by the political strategy of the state.

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