Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo and Loureiro, Paulo Roberto and Souza, Nathalia Almeida (2011): An Empirical Evaluation of an Evolutionary Game Theory Model of the Labor Market.
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In this paper we intend to perform an empirical evaluation of the evolutionary game theory model of the labor market developed by Araujo and Souza (2010). In order to accomplish this task we focus on the Brazilian labor market by using data from the National Household Sampling Survey – PNAD/IBGE, from 1995 to 2008. We used four different methodologies: the OLS, Pseudo-panel with fixed effects, Instrumental Variables and the Heckman Selection Model. Results indicate that the main difference between the 1995-2002 and 2003-2008 period is the impact of education over wages. According to these findings, investments in education were more profitable for the 2003-2008 period. However, all wage gaps between formal and informal markets reduced considerably.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||An Empirical Evaluation of an Evolutionary Game Theory Model of the Labor Market|
|Keywords:||formal and informal and labor market, evolutionary game theory.|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor > J23 - Labor Demand
|Depositing User:||Ricardo Araujo|
|Date Deposited:||24. Apr 2011 13:01|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 14:36|
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