Pradiptyo, Rimawan and Sasmitasiwi, Banoon and Sahadewo, Gumilang Aryo (2011): Evidence of homo economicus? Findings from experiment on evolutionary prisoners' dilemma game.
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This paper aims to analyze subjects’ behavior in an experiment on evolutionary process of prisoners’ dilemma game. The experiment has been designed by using sixteen one-shot prisoners’ dilemma games with payoffs perturbation and random matching players under perfect information. The subjects of the experiment were students and staff in Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. In contrast to previous studies, for instance Selten and Stoecker’s (1986) Cooper’s, et.al (1991, 1996), the majority of the subjects in this experiment tend to choose Nash equilibrium strategy consistently from the first game. The result showed that the proportion of the Nash equilibrium outcome was consistently in the range of 85%-88%, whereas the tacit cooperation or Pareto optimum outcome was about 1%-2%. There were evidence that payoffs perturbation influences players’ decision. In contrast to the previous studies above, the results from this study revealed that the vast majority of the subjects tend to choose the dominant strategy as prescribed in Game Theory.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Evidence of homo economicus? Findings from experiment on evolutionary prisoners' dilemma game|
|English Title:||Evidence of homo economicus? Findings from experiment on evolutionary prisoners' dilemma game|
|Keywords:||Prisoners' dilemma, experiment, random-matching players, payoffs perturbation, framing effect|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Rimawan Pradiptyo|
|Date Deposited:||26. Apr 2011 18:17|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 21:21|
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