Caruso, Raul (2007): THE Economics of Match-Fixing.
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The phenomenon of match-fixing does constitute a constant element of sport contests. This paper presents a simple formal model in order to explain it. The intuition behind is that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is the key factor leading to match-fixing. In sum, this paper considers a partial equilibrium model of contest where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently a contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the contest. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments in ‘contest management’ – namely efforts paving the way for a match-fixing. In particular, it will be demonstrated that, under some conditions, an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake can lead to a concession from one agent to the other and then to a match-fixing. Eventually the intuitions and results of the model will be applied to make a comparison between the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Champions League tournaments.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||THE Economics of Match-Fixing|
|Keywords:||Contest; Football; Sport Contest; Contest Management; Match-Fixing; Asymmetry in evaluation; Concession; FIFA; UEFA; CHampions League; World Cup|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L83 - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
|Depositing User:||Raul Caruso|
|Date Deposited:||05. May 2007|
|Last Modified:||14. Feb 2014 10:53|
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