Ben Youssef, Slim and Dinar, Zeineb (2009): Regulation of a duopoly and environmental R&D.
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We develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of R&D level, the regulator can induce the first best outcome. Interestingly, the investment in R&D is actually taxed when the marginal damage cost of pollution is high enough, because firms are tempted to overinvest in research.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Regulation of a duopoly and environmental R&D|
|Keywords:||Duopoly; Emission tax; R&D subsidy; First best.|
|Subjects:||H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities
O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights > O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Slim Ben Youssef|
|Date Deposited:||16. Jun 2011 13:11|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 12:06|
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Available Versions of this Item
Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale. (deposited 10. Feb 2010 07:11)
Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale. (deposited 27. Apr 2010 06:20)
Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale. (deposited 05. May 2010 11:39)
- Regulation of a duopoly and environmental R&D. (deposited 16. Jun 2011 13:11) [Currently Displayed]
- Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale. (deposited 05. May 2010 11:39)
- Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale. (deposited 27. Apr 2010 06:20)