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In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections

Colignatus, Thomas (2007): In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections. Unpublished.

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Abstract

Democratic nations are advised to have parliaments select the chief executive by the Borda Fixed Point method. The current practice of having direct popular elections using systems that have originated in history is inoptimal and actually quite undemocratic since winners are selected who don’t reflect the national sentiment. The paper gives the example of the 2007 French presidential elections. Under the currently and historically grown system of run-off plurality Sarkozy got elected while the more democratic method of Borda Fixed Point would have generated Bayrou. The example uses reasonable assumptions on underlying micro preferences.

Item Type:MPRA Paper
Institution:Thomas Cool Consultancy & Econometrics
Language:English
Keywords:voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; run-off plurality; Borda Fixed Point; democracy
Subjects:D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
H - Public Economics > H0 - General
A - General Economics and Teaching > A2 - Economics Education and Teaching of Economics
ID Code:3170
Deposited By:Thomas Colignatus
Deposited On:11. May 2007
Last Modified:07. Nov 2007 03:01
References:

Colignatus is the preferred name of Thomas Cool in science

Colignatus (2007), “Voting theory for democracy”, 2nd edition, Thomas Cool Consultancy & Econometrics

Wikipedia (2007), Data on the French elections, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_France (Retrieved May 9 2007)

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