Estrada, Fernando and Mutascu, Mihai and Tiwari, Aviral (2011): Estabilidad política y tributación.
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The present study is, in particular, an attempt to test the relationship between tax level and political stability by using some economic control variables and to see the relationship among government effectiveness, corruption, and GDP. For the purpose, we used the Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach in the panel framework, using a country-level panel data from 59 countries for the period 2002 to 2008. The salient features of this model are: (a) simplicity is based on a limited number of variables (five) are categorical or continuous and not dependent on complex interactions or nonlinear effects. (b) accuracy: a low level of errors, the model achieves a high percentage of accuracy in distinguishing countries with inclination to political instability, compared to countries with political stability, (c) generality: the model allows to distinguish types of political instability, both resulting from acts of violence and failure of democracies to show, and (d) novelty: the model incorporates a tool that helps evaluate and exclude many variables used by the conventional literature. This approach is mainly based on the recognition of state structures and the relations between elites and parties.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Estabilidad política y tributación|
|English Title:||Taxation and political stability|
|Keywords:||Taxation, Political Stability, Connection, Effects, Panel VAR analysis|
|Subjects:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy
N - Economic History > N1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations > N10 - General, International, or Comparative
B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B22 - Macroeconomics
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C93 - Field Experiments
D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D53 - Financial Markets
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E1 - General Aggregative Models > E17 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C02 - Mathematical Methods
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E0 - General > E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H20 - General
O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies > O50 - General
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook > E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables > C33 - Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C5 - Econometric Modeling > C53 - Forecasting and Prediction Methods; Simulation Methods
B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B23 - Econometrics; Quantitative and Mathematical Studies
A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C2 - Single Equation Models; Single Variables > C23 - Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B4 - Economic Methodology > B41 - Economic Methodology
|Depositing User:||Fernando Estrada|
|Date Deposited:||25. Jul 2011 13:41|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 10:34|
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