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A conjectural cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games

Currarini, Sergio and Marini, Marco (2002): A conjectural cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games. Published in: Game Practise and the Environment (2004)

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Abstract

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements.

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