On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Bimatrix Game Forms

Kukushkin, Nikolai S.; Litan, Cristian M. and Marhuenda, Francisco (2007): On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Bimatrix Game Forms. Unpublished.

Abstract

We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is in an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of mixed Nash equilibria induces a continuum of outcome distributions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Game form; Mixed Nash equilibrium; Generic finiteness
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

References

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