Lipatov, Vilen (2005): Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists.
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We analyze the role of accounting specialists who help corporations evade/avoid taxes in a game of incomplete information played by a tax authority, corporate taxpayers, and an accounting specialist. In addition to a full equilibrium characterization, we establish that (i) marginal changes in enforcement are not effective when evasion/avoidance is pervasive; (ii) fi�nes on fi�rms as opposed to specialists are more effective in such situations; (iii) reducing auditing costs and increasing "creative accounting" costs are effective in curbing evasion when tax compliance is relatively high.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Institution:||European University Institute, Hannover University|
|Original Title:||Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists|
|Keywords:||tax evasion; tax avoidance; tax compliance; sophisticated evasion|
|Subjects:||H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents > H32 - Firm
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion
|Depositing User:||Vilen Lipatov|
|Date Deposited:||10. Oct 2011 10:50|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 19:03|
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Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists. (deposited 24. Mar 2009 04:48)
Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists. (deposited 15. Sep 2010 10:59)
- Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists. (deposited 10. Oct 2011 10:50) [Currently Displayed]
- Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists. (deposited 15. Sep 2010 10:59)