Jaag, Christian (2006): Teacher Incentives.
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This paper considers hidden teacher effort in educational production and discusses the implications of multiple teacher effort dimensions on optimum incentive contracts in a theoretical framework. The analysis of educational production in a multitask framework is a new and unique contribution of this paper to the economics of education. We first characterize the first-best and second-best outcomes. The model is extended to address specific questions concerning teacher incentive schemes: We compare input- to output-based accountability measures and study the implication of the level of aggregation in performance measures. Against the background of the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of teacher incentives, we argue that performance measures should be as broad as possible. Further, we present the optimum contract for motivated teachers. Finally, if education is produced in teacher teams, we establish the conditions for optimum team-based and individual incentives: The larger the spillover effects across teacher efforts and the better the measurability of educational achievement, the stronger the case for team-based incentives.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Teacher Incentives|
|Subjects:||M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions > I21 - Analysis of Education
|Depositing User:||Christian Jaag|
|Date Deposited:||09. Oct 2006|
|Last Modified:||24. Mar 2015 11:01|