Mendes-Da-Silva, Wesley (2011): Small worlds and board interlocking in Brazil: a longitudinal study of corporate networks, 1997-2007.
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Social Network Analysis (SNA) is an emerging research field in finance, above all in Brazil. This work is pioneering in that it is supported by reference to different areas of knowledge: social network analysis and corporate governance, for dealing with a similarly emerging topic in finance; interlocking boards, the purpose being to check the validity of the small-world model in the Brazilian capital market, and the existence of associations between the positioning of the firm in the network of corporate relationships and its worth. To do so official data relating to more than 400 companies listed in Brazil between 1997 and 2007 were used. The main results obtained suggest that the configuration of the networks of relationships between board members and companies reflects the small-world model. Furthermore, there seems to be a significant relationship between the firm’s centrality and its worth, described according to an “inverted U” curve, which suggests the existence of optimum values of social prominence in the corporate network.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Small worlds and board interlocking in Brazil: a longitudinal study of corporate networks, 1997-2007|
|English Title:||Small Worlds and Board Interlocking in Brazil: A Longitudinal Study of Corporate Networks, 1997-2007|
|Keywords:||Board Interlocking; Social Network Analysis in Finance; Company Boards|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
|Depositing User:||Wesley Mendes-Da-Silva|
|Date Deposited:||17. Oct 2011 21:11|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 17:53|
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