Redistribution through tax evasion

Adam, Antonis and Kammas, Pantelis (2011): Redistribution through tax evasion.

Abstract

Using a simple model of income redistribution, we show that the government may use tax evasion as a way to redistribute income from the non- evaders to evaders. This will result then to a negative association between income inequality and per capita transfers and inefficiently high taxes.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: redistribution; inequality; tax evasion
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H10 - General; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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