Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Collusion in board of directors

Bourjade, Sylvain and Germain, Laurent (2011): Collusion in board of directors.

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to study what is the best structure of a Board of Directors when collusive aspects between the Board and the CEO are taken into account. We analyze how shareholders should select the members of the Board in a framework with asymmetric information and uncertainty about the optimal projects for the firm. In particular, we examine the optimal degree of independence of the Board from a shareholders perspective. This allows us to state when it is beneficial for shareholders to have an insider-oriented board or an outsider oriented board with a majority of independent directors when collusion is a major threat.

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