Mueller, Christopher and Boehme, Enrico (2011): The monopoly benchmark on two-sided markets.
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The literature on the effects of market concentration in platform industries or two-sided markets often compares the competitive outcome against a benchmark. This benchmark is either the “joint management” solution in which one decision maker runs all platforms or a “pure” monopoly with just one platform. Literature has not generally discussed, which benchmark is the appropriate one. We show that the appropriate benchmark, i.e. how many platforms the monopolist will operate, depends on whether agents multi- or singlehome, whether the externalities are positive or negative, and in some cases on the properties of the demand functions. Different situations require different benchmarks. Our results also help to anticipate the effects of proposed platform mergers, where the assessment might crucially depend on the number of platforms after a merger.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The monopoly benchmark on two-sided markets|
|Keywords:||two-sided markets; market concentration; monopoly|
|Subjects:||K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K20 - General
L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation
L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D42 - Monopoly
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
|Depositing User:||Christopher Mueller|
|Date Deposited:||25. Nov 2011 12:59|
|Last Modified:||26. May 2015 02:02|
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