Pessoa, Argentino (2011): The Euro Area sovereign debt crisis: Some implications of its systemic dimension.
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After the beginning of the euro area, countries in its periphery engaged in weighty borrowing from foreign private investors, allowing domestic spending to outpace incomes. Now, these countries face debt crises reflecting a loss of creditor confidence in the sustainability of their finances from which results an abrupt end in private foreign lending to these economies. The debt crisis made evident the asymmetry between core and periphery countries, which is visible in trends in saving, consumption and investment. These divergent patterns have contributed to view the debt crisis as a problem of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) that can be contained in the periphery, or as a new version of the fable of the Grasshopper and the Ant. We dispute this reductionism showing that the debt crisis is systemic and its solution cannot be found with more fiscal rules and austerity in peripheral countries alone. It will imply, if not an increase in fiscal and political integration, at least a higher coordination at the political and economic front and a new governance structure.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The Euro Area sovereign debt crisis: Some implications of its systemic dimension|
|Keywords:||Debt crisis; Euro Area; EFSF; ESM; Fiscal rules; PIIGS; Systemic crisis; Solvency|
|Subjects:||F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F15 - Economic Integration
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy
F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F36 - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G - Financial Economics > G0 - General > G01 - Financial Crises
|Depositing User:||Argentino Pessoa|
|Date Deposited:||10. Dec 2011 15:21|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 11:32|
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