Simplice A, Asongu (2011): Law, democracy and the quality of government in Africa.
Download (185kB) | Preview
This paper examines the big questions of African comparative politics. It assesses the interaction of three crucial components in the development of the continent: law, democracy and quality of government. Political regimes of democracy, polity and autocracy are instrumented with income-levels, legal-origins, religious-dominations and press-freedom levels to account for government quality dynamics of corruption-control, government-effectiveness, voice and accountability, political-stability, regulation quality and rule of law. Findings indicate democracy has an edge over autocracy while the later and polity overlap. A democracy that takes into account only the voice of the majority is better in government quality than autocracy, while a democracy that takes into account the voice of the minority (polity) is worse in government quality than autocracy. As a policy implication, democracy once initiated should be accelerated to edge the appeals of authoritarian regimes and reap the benefits of time and level hypotheses.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Law, democracy and the quality of government in Africa|
|Keywords:||Law; Politics; Democracy; Government Policy; Development|
|Subjects:||P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P43 - Public Economics; Financial Economics
O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O10 - General
K - Law and Economics > K0 - General > K00 - General
P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy
P - Economic Systems > P5 - Comparative Economic Systems > P50 - General
|Depositing User:||Simplice Anutechia Asongu|
|Date Deposited:||20. Dec 2011 21:32|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 02:03|
Agbor, J.A., (2011). “How Does Colonial Origin Matter for Economic Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa”, World Institute for Development Economics Research, Working Paper, No. 2011/27.
Asongu, S. A., (2011a). “Law, finance, economic growth and welfare: why does legal origin matter?”, MPRA Paper No. 33868.
Asongu, S. A.,(2011b). “Law, finance and investment: does legal origin matter?”, MPRA Paper No. 34698.
Asongu, S. A., (2011c). “Law and investment in Africa”, MPRA Paper No.34700.
Asongu, S. A.,(2011d). “Law and finance in Africa”, MPRA Paper No. 34080.
Asongu, S.A., (2011e). “Why do French civil-law countries have higher levels of financial efficiency?”, MPRA Paper No.33950.
Armijo, L., E., (1999). Financial Globalization and Democracy in Emerging Markets. New York:Palgrave Macmillan.
Back, H., & Hadenius, A., (2008). “Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped Relationship.” Governance, 21 (1),pp. 1–24.
Baum, M. A., & Lake, D.A., (2001). “The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services”, Comparative Political Studies, 34, pp.587-621.
Baum, M. A., & Lake, D.A.,(2003). “The Political Economy of Growth: democracy and human capital”, American Journal of Political Science, 47, pp.333-347.
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R.,(2003). “Law and finance: why does legal origin matter?”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, pp. 653-675.
Bhagwati, J., (1995). “Democracy and Development: new thinking on an old question”, Indian Economic Review, 30(1), pp.1-18.
Blanchard, O., & Shleifer, A., (2000). “Federalism with and without political centralization; China versus Russia,” NBER working paper No. 7616.
Charron, N., & Lapuente, V., (2009), “ Does Democracy Produce Quality of Government?”, Quality of Government Institute Working Paper Series: 2009-1.
Clague, C., Keefer, P, Knack, S., & Olson. M., (1996). “Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies,” Journal of Economic Growth, 1, pp. 243-76.
Diamond, L. J., (2007). “A quarter-century of promoting democracy”. Journal of Democracy, 18, pp.118-120.
Doucouliagos, H., & Ulubasoglu, M., A., (2008). “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis”, American Journal of Political Science, 52(1), pp. 61-83.
El Badawi, I., & Makdisi, S.,(2007), “Explaining the democracy deficit in the Arab world”, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46, pp. 813-831.
Haggard, S., (1997). Democratic Institutions and Economic Policy, in Christopher Clague (ed.), Institutions and Economic Development. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Harris-White, B. & White, G., (1996), Liberalization and New Forms of Corruption. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
IMF (2005, June), “The IMF Approach to Promoting Good Governance and Combating Corruption-A Guide”, International Monetary Fund.
Keefer, P., (2007). “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies”, American Journal of Political Science 51 (4), pp. 804–821.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W., (1997). “Legal Determinants of External Finance”, Journal of Finance, 52, pp. 1131-1150.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W., (1998). “Law and finance”, Journal of Political Economy, 106, pp.1113-1155.
Lemarchand, R. (1972). "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building," American Political Science Review, 66(1), pp. 68-85.
Montinola, G. R., & Jackman, R.W. (2002). "Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study." British Journal of Political Science, 32, pp.147–170.
Mulligan, C.B., Gil, R., & Sala-i-Martin, X., (2004), “Do democracies have different public policies that on nondemocracries”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, pp.51-74.
Narayan, P.K., Narayan, S., & Smyth, R., (2011). “Does democracy facilitate economic growth or does economic growth facilitate democracy? An empirical study of Sub-Saharan Africa”. Economic Modelling, 28(3), pp.900-910.
North, D., (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press.
Olson, M., (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Oscarsson, H., (2008), “Media and Quality of Government: A research overview”, Quality of Government Working Paper Series, 2008/12.
Rao, V., (1984). “Democracy and economic development”, Studies on Competitive International Development, 19, pp. 67-81.
Rodrik, D., (2000). “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: what they are and how to acquire them”, Studies in International Comparative Development, 35, pp.3-31.
Rothstein, B., (2011), “Quality of government and epistemic democracy”, Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg.
Sayari, S., (1977). “Political Patronage in Turkey”, in E. Gellner and J. Waterbury (eds.), Patons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, London: Duckworth, pp. 103-113.
Scott, J. C., (1972). Comparative Political Corruption, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Shen, J., (2002). “Democracy and growth: An alternative empirical approach”, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition, BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2002.
Stulz, R., M., & Williamson, R., (2003). “Culture, Openness and Finance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 70, pp. 313-349.
Sung, H.E., (2004). “Democracy and political corruption: a cross-national comparison.” Crime,Law and Social Change 41, pp.179–194.
Vaidya, S., (2005). "Corruption in the media's gaze", European Journal of Political Economy, 21, pp.667-87.
Varese, F., (1997). “The Transition to the Market and Corruption in Post-socialist Russia”,Political Studies, 45, pp. 579–96.
Wade, R., (1985). “The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is not better at Development.” World Development, 13, pp. 467–97.
Weyland, K., (1998). “The Politics of Corruption in Latin America”. Journal of Democracy, 9 (2), pp.108-121.
Yang, B.,(2011). “Does democracy foster financial development? An empirical analysis”, Economic Letters, 112, pp.262-265.