Barlo, Mehmet and Ozdogan, Ayca (2011): Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation.
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This study analyzes a continuous-time N-agent Brownian hidden-action model with exponential utilities, in which agents' actions jointly determine the mean and the variance of the outcome process. In order to give a theoretical justi¯cation for the use of linear contracts, as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), we consider a variant of its generalization given by Sung (1995), into which collusion and renegotiation possibilities among agents are incorporated. In this model, we prove that there exists a linear and stationary optimal compensation scheme which is also immune to collusion and renegotiation.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation|
|Keywords:||Principal-agent problems; moral hazard; linear contracts; continuous-time model; Brownian motion martingale method; collusion,; renegotiation; team|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Mehmet Barlo|
|Date Deposited:||23. Dec 2011 16:06|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 02:07|
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