Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme (2011): Strategic behavior in nonatomic games.

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Abstract
In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in nonatomic games with a societal choice, this study proposes a refinement of Nash equilibrium, strategic equilibrium. Given a nonatomic game, its perturbed game is one in which every player believes that he alone has a small, but positive, impact on the societal choice; and a distribution is a strategic equilibrium if it is a limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibrium distributions of games in which each player's belief about his impact on the societal choice goes to zero. After proving the existence of strategic equilibria, we show that all of them must be Nash. Moreover, it is displayed that in many economic applications, the set of strategic equilibria coincides with that of Nash equilibria of large finite games.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Strategic behavior in nonatomic games 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Strategic equilibrium; Games with a continuum of players; Equilibrium distributions 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  35549 
Depositing User:  Mehmet Barlo 
Date Deposited:  23. Dec 2011 16:09 
Last Modified:  15. Feb 2013 19:40 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/35549 