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Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information

Bhowmik, Anuj and Cao, Jiling (2011): Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information.

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Abstract

In this paper, we study asymmetric information economies consisting of both non-negligible and negligible agents and having ordered Banach spaces as their commodity spaces. In answering a question of Herves-Beloso and Moreno-Garcia in [17], we establish a characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition. It is also shown that when an economy contains only negligible agents a Vind's type theorem on the private core with the exact feasibility can be restored. This solves a problem of Pesce in [20].

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