Extensive Capture: the rise of international industrial regulation

Marquez, Carlos (2007): Extensive Capture: the rise of international industrial regulation.

Abstract

This research project tries to show that a unified discourse and a single global policy for liberalization and competition cuts across the economic and legal theory of transnational regulations of industry. The tension mediated by the concepts of harmonization, meaning that one regulation/standard is better that multiple regulations/standards, and the theory of international liberalization, meaning deregulation is better that regulation, brings many doubts about the phenomenon of international industrial regulation. The core of this project is to restate the problem of regulatory capture at a transnational level and show how it is possible, and profitable, for large corporations to capture transnational regulators with multilateral regulation or deregulation processes.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: International industrial regulation; international law; soft law; hard law; harmonization; industrial organization; law and economics
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law; L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L59 - Other

References

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