Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo and Moreira, Helmar Nunes (2011): Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market.
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In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the game theory evolutionary set up. In this vein a complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labor market is provided.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market|
|Keywords:||Evolutionary game theory approach, labour market, informal economy, Lyapunov function|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor > J23 - Labor Demand
|Depositing User:||Ricardo Araujo|
|Date Deposited:||25. Feb 2012 21:18|
|Last Modified:||20. Feb 2013 00:35|
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