Roman, Mihai Daniel (2008): Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations. Published in: Journal of Applied Quantitative Methods No. 1/2009 (30. January 2009): pp. 116.

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Abstract
Our paper considers a “negotiation game” between two players which combines the features of twoplayers alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Generally, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibriums but some of which involve delay and inefficiency. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for cooperation and efficiency in repeated games. The Folk Theorem of repeated games is a very used result that shows if players are enough patience then it is possible to obtain a cooperative equilibrium of the infinite repeated game. We proof a new folk theorem for finitely repeated games and also we find new conditions (under stage number and minimum discount factor value) such that players cooperate at least one period in cooperativepunishment repeated games. Finally we present a studycase for Cournot oligopoly situation for n enterprises behavior under finitely and infinitely repeated negotiations. We found for this situation discount factor depends only on players number, not on different player’s payoffs.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Negotiation Game, Repeated Game, Bargaining, Folk theorem, Bounded Rationality, Cournot oligopoly 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78  Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory L  Industrial Organization > L1  Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13  Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets D  Microeconomics > D4  Market Structure and Pricing > D43  Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73  Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games 
Item ID:  37527 
Depositing User:  Mihai Daniel Roman 
Date Deposited:  21. Mar 2012 13:33 
Last Modified:  12. Feb 2013 17:59 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/37527 