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Asymmetric Cournot duopoly: game complete analysis

Carfì, David and Perrone, Emanuele (2012): Asymmetric Cournot duopoly: game complete analysis.

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Abstract

In this paper we apply the Complete Analysis of Differentiable Games (introduced by D. Carfì in [3], [6], [8], [9]; already employed by himself and others in [4], [5], [7]) and some new algorithms using the software wxMaxima 11.04.0, in order to reach a total scenario knowledge (that is the total knowledge of the payoff space of the interaction) of the classic Cournot Duopoly (1838), viewed as a complex interaction between two competitive subjects, in a particularly interesting asymmetric case. Moreover, in this work we propose a theoretical justification, for a general kind of asymmetric duopolistic interactions (which often appear in the real economic world), by considering and proposing a Cobb-Douglas perturbation of the classic linear model of production costs.

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