Cuciniello, Vincenzo (2007): Strategic monetary policy in a monetary union with non-atomistic wage setters.
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In a micro-founded framework in line with the new open economy macroeconomics, the paper shows that more centralized wage setting (CWS) and central bank conservatism (CBC) curb unemployment only if labor market distortions are sizeable. When labor market distortions are sufficiently low, employment may be maximized by atomistic wage setters or a populist CB. The comparison between a national monetary policy (NMP) regime and the monetary union (MU) reveals that a move to a MU boosts inflation in the absence of strategic effects. However, when strategic interactions between CB(s) and trade unions are taken into account, the shift to a MU when monopoly distortions are sizeable unambiguously increases welfare and employment either in presence of a sufficiently conservative CB or with a fully CWS. Finally, when labor market distortions are less relevant, an ultra-populist CB or atomistic wage setters are optimal for the society and a shift to a MU regime is unambiguously welfare improving.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Strategic monetary policy in a monetary union with non-atomistic wage setters|
|Keywords:||Central bank conservatism; centralization of wage setting; inflationary bias; monetary union|
|Subjects:||F - International Economics > F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance > F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics
F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F31 - Foreign Exchange
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
|Depositing User:||Vincenzo Cuciniello|
|Date Deposited:||03. Jul 2007|
|Last Modified:||18. Feb 2013 09:43|
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