Mullat, Joseph E. (2012): The sugar-pie game.
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Abstract
Playing a bargaining game the players are trying to enlarge their share of a sugar-pie. However, HE is not very keen on sweets and does not prefer a piece of the pie if the size of the pie is too small or too large. In HIS view, too small or too large pies are not of a reasonable quality. In contrast, SHE, the second actor, likes sweets what ever they are. HE is a soft negotiator but SHE is a tough negotiator. The paper addresses the problem: what should be HIS power of negotiations if an equal ½-division of the pie is desirable.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | The sugar-pie game |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | bargaining power; bargaining game |
| Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory |
| Item ID: | 37901 |
| Depositing User: | Joseph E. Mullat |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Apr 2012 16:24 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 16:45 |
| References: | 1. Kalai, E. (1977) Nonsymmetric Nash Solutions and Replications of 2-Person Bargaining, International Journal of Game Theory 6, 129 133. |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/37901 |
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