Setty, Ofer (2012): Unemployment accounts.
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Unemployment Accounts (UA) are mandatory individual saving accounts that can be used by governments as an alternative to the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system. I study a two tier UA-UI system where the unemployed withdraw from their unemployment account until it is exhausted and then receive unemployment benefits. The hybrid policy provides insurance to workers more efficiently than a traditional UI because it provides government benefits selectively. Using a structural model calibrated to the US economy, I find that relative to a two tier UI system the hybrid policy leads to a welfare gain of 0.9%.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Unemployment accounts|
|Keywords:||Unemployment Accounts; Unemployment Insurance; Job-search; Moral hazard; Mechanism Design; Optimal Policy;|
|Subjects:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment > E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies > J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies > J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook > E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
|Depositing User:||Ofer Setty|
|Date Deposited:||12. Apr 2012 13:29|
|Last Modified:||11. Feb 2013 17:12|
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