Roman, Mihai Daniel (2010): A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences. Published in: Proceedings of International conference NEW CHALLENGES IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY SCIENCES 2010 (28. September 2010): pp. 104-110.
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During history, an aggressive country seeks to force non-aggressive countries to made many concessions based on military force. In our paper we discuss the situation that one aggressive country is dissatisfied with its current position and try to obtain more concessions from a rival country. To analyze this situation we use a game theory dynamic model in complete and incomplete information. We analyze the countries behavior depending especially on aggressive or non-aggressive strategies and also on battle power. In this context we found conditions to obtain separating and pooling equilibriums for dynamic games in incomplete information. Main result shows that countries behavior depends especially on war costs and on country military power. There are many applications of these types of models, like in Israel - Palestinian war, recent Russian- Georgian conflict or US defense policy.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences|
|Keywords:||War, Negotiation Game, Repeated Game, Bargaining, Folk theorem, Bounded Rationality|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Mihai Daniel Roman|
|Date Deposited:||27. Apr 2012 00:18|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 02:12|
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