Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Matching, Wage Rigidities and Efficient Severance Pay

Fella, Giulio (2012): Matching, Wage Rigidities and Efficient Severance Pay.

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Abstract

This paper studies the effect mandated severance pay in a matching model featuring wage rigidity for ongoing, but not new, matches and Pareto efficient spot renegotiation of mandated severance pay. Severance pay matters only if real wage rigidities imply inefficient separation under employment at will. In such a case, large enough severance payments reduce job destruction and increase job creation and social efficiency, under very mild conditions. Efficient renegotiation implies that severance pay never results in privately inefficient labour hoarding and that its marginal effect is zero when its size exceeds that which induces the same allocation that would prevail in the absence of wage rigidity. These results hold under alternative micro-foundations for wage rigidity.

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