Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Rentes et corruption au maroc théorie et evidence

Jellal, Mohamed and Bouzahzah, Mohamed (2012): Rentes et corruption au maroc théorie et evidence.

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Abstract

This paper is part of a large research agenda by our Institute on the causes and consequences of moroccan corruption . This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically the main determinants of firms corruption in Morocco firms in the formal sector. It is shown that the presence of rents linked to favoritism and patronage practices is fundamental in explaining corruption. This endemic corruption can then explain the lack of productive performance of Moroccan firms. Institutional reforms would greatly be desirable to encourage efficiency in the industrial sector which is the main engine of economic growth.

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