Camacho-Gutiérrez, Pablo and González-Cantú, Vanessa M. (2007): Moral hazard in a voluntary deposit insurance system: Revisited.
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This paper extends Wheelock and Kumbhakar’s (1995) test for moral hazard in the Kansas deposit insurance system (1910-1920). This paper tests and finds evidence of omitted bank-specific effects. Estimates in Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1995), as a result, are biased. This paper introduces unobserved individual heterogeneity to the test for moral hazard, corrects their estimates, and finds more evidence of moral hazard in the Kansas deposit insurance system.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Moral hazard in a voluntary deposit insurance system: Revisited|
|Keywords:||Deposit insurance; moral hazard test; panel data; random and fixed effects|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables > C33 - Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables > C35 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
|Depositing User:||Pablo Camacho-Gutiérrez|
|Date Deposited:||09. Jul 2007|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 21:45|
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