Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Moral hazard in a voluntary deposit insurance system: Revisited

Camacho-Gutiérrez, Pablo and González-Cantú, Vanessa M. (2007): Moral hazard in a voluntary deposit insurance system: Revisited.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_3909.pdf

Download (234Kb) | Preview

Abstract

This paper extends Wheelock and Kumbhakar’s (1995) test for moral hazard in the Kansas deposit insurance system (1910-1920). This paper tests and finds evidence of omitted bank-specific effects. Estimates in Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1995), as a result, are biased. This paper introduces unobserved individual heterogeneity to the test for moral hazard, corrects their estimates, and finds more evidence of moral hazard in the Kansas deposit insurance system.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.