Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet

Wu, Haoyang (2012): Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_39268.pdf

Download (258kB) | Preview

Abstract

The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we propose that if agents report messages to the designer through channels (\emph{e.g.}, Internet), agents can construct a self-enforcing agreement such that any Pareto-inefficient social choice rule satisfying monotonicity and no-veto will not be Nash implementable when an additional condition is satisfied. The key points are: 1) The agreement is unobservable to the designer, and the designer cannot prevent the agents from constructing such agreement; 2) The agents act non-cooperatively, and the Maskin mechanism remain unchanged from the designer's perspective.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.