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Foreign Aid and Political Influence of the Development Assistance Committee Countries

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Abstract

This paper empirically examines whether voting coincidence in the United Nations General Assembly increases between donors and recipients after foreign aid is distributed. It extends previous literature by expanding the donor countries considered and by testing the long-run political influence of aid. The results show that Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom exhibit a positive relationship between voting coincidence and aid distribution. The results also show a positive relationship between voting coincidence and aid for the United States, but only in the long run when the yearly panels are collapsed into three-year averages. The latter result may provide an explanation for why previous studies find mixed results as to whether the United States uses aid for political support. The results are robust to the inclusion of measures of economic power, military power, dependence on foreign support, and international trade patterns.

Keywords
Official Development Assistance (ODA), UN General Assembly, voting coincidence

JEL Codes
O43, F35

Foreign Aid and Political Influence of the Development Assistance Committee Countries

I. Introduction

This paper empirically examines whether aid recipients adopt donor preferences by voting more frequently with donors in United Nations General Assembly roll call votes after receiving foreign aid. This analysis extends the literature exploring whether foreign aid influences the political relationship between aid donors and recipients in two ways. First, it expands the donor countries considered. While most previous research focuses exclusively on the United States, this paper considers each of the 22 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).[1] Second, this paper tests the long-run political influence by collapsing the yearly panel into three-year averages and comparing the results to the basic model. The empirical results provide evidence that Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom exhibit a positive relationship between voting coincidence and foreign aid distribution. The results also show a positive relationship between voting coincidence and aid for the United States, but only in the long run when the yearly panels are collapsed into three-year averages. The latter result may provide an explanation for why previous studies find mixed results as to whether the United States uses aid for political support. The results are robust to the inclusion of measures of economic power, military power, dependence on foreign support, and international trade patterns.

Donor intention influences foreign aid distribution (Maizels and Nissanke 1984, White and Morrissey 1997, and Alesina and Dollar 2000) and while donor intention can be philanthropic, actual donor behavior shows donors are less altruistic then they claim (Meernik et al. 1998 and Langhammer 2004). Numerous examples show that donors pursue their own self-interest in bilateral aid allocation (McGillivray 2003). USAID, the United States' development agency, gives foreign assistance to "further America's foreign policy interest in expanding democracy and free markets."[2] AusAid, Australia's

[1] Single country members of the DAC used in the analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. South Korea is excluded because it did not become a member until January 1, 2010.

[2] http://www.usaid.ogv/about_usaid/

development agency, grants aid "in line with Australia's national interest."[3] Part of Canada's aid agency's mission is to "engage in policy development in Canada and internationally, *enabling Canada's effort to realize its development objectives"* (italics added). [4] With their aid, France promotes French culture, Japan furthers its economic interests (Schraeder et al. 1998), and Portugal supports the diffusion of its language.[5]

DAC countries are used in the analysis because they are the primary donors of bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) and each DAC country has a major foreign aid program according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Between 1991 and 2008, DAC countries conferred 74 percent of total ODA compared to 2.5 percent for non-DAC countries and 23.5 percent for multilateral aid agencies In only one year since 1991 was the percentage of total bilateral ODA given by DAC countries lower than 71 percent (60.6 percent in 2006). Since 1991, 15 of the 22 DAC countries have contributed at least one percent of total bilateral ODA, five countries have given at least five percent of total ODA, and two countries (Japan and the United States) have granted at least ten percent of total ODA.

II. Literature Review

Donors use aid to influence decisions in international organizations. In their examination of the UN Security Council, Kuziemko and Werker (2006) find nonpermanent members receive an average of $16 million of additional funding from the United States and $1 million of additional funding from the UN during "typical" years, just for their council membership. During years where the Security Council is placed in the spotlight, nonpermanent members receive $45 million of additional funding from the US and $8 million of additional funding from the UN.

[3] http://www.ausaid.gov.au/
[4] www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/
[5] http://www.ipan.mne.gov/pt/

Voting behavior of aid recipients is also targeted using the multilateral aid of the IMF and World Bank, even though using multilateral aid is an indirect avenue of influence since donors lack direct control over these funds. Oatley and Yackee (2004) and Barro and Lee (2005) find the IMF grants additional money to governments closely aligned with the United States. Faini and Grilli (2004) report World Bank and IMF lending is largely influenced by the United States and the European Union. Thacker (1999), Stone (2002), and Dreher and Jensen (2007) show developing countries receive more favorable borrowing terms from the IMF when they have closer ties to the US while Dreher and Sturm (2006) show countries receiving financial support from the IMF and World Bank vote more frequently with G7 countries in the UN General Assembly.

The most frequently researched area concerning foreign aid and political support is the use of bilateral ODA in influencing the voting behavior of recipient countries in the UN General Assembly. Three reasons may explain this research clustering. First, all roll call votes are recorded in every session for all voting members, creating an availability of data. Second, the UN is an important player in international affairs. Lastly, donors have direct control of bilateral ODA so they can use it for their own purposes, including building political influence. It is no surprise then that G7 countries closely monitor the voting behavior of other countries (Anderson et al. 2006). For example, the US State Department has kept records of the voting coincidence rates of member countries for "important" votes since 1983.

The empirical evidence that donors successfully use bilateral foreign aid to shape recipients' voting behavior is inconclusive and mixed. Kato (1969), Kegley and Hook (1991), Sexton and Decker (1992), Dreher and Sturm (2006), and Morey and Lai (2006) find aid is an ineffective instrument in influencing recipient voting behavior. However, Bernstein and Alpert (1971), Rai (1972 and 1980), Wittkopf (1973), Lundborg (1998), Wang (1999), and Dreher et al. (2008) find foreign aid increases voting coincidence between donor and recipient. Some of these studies utilize short time horizons with correlation analysis or bivariate regressions while other studies employ longer time horizons and panel estimation techniques, but none of the empirical methods show a consistent positive relationship between foreign aid and voting coincidence.

In most of these studies the aid donor considered is the United States. However, some studies have expanded the scope of donor countries considered. Wittkopf (1973) focuses on the 16 members of the DAC in 1973 and the Soviet Bloc. Lundborg (1998) analyzes the US and Soviet Union. Dreher et al. (2008) considers the G7 countries. This paper extends the analysis further by considering all 22 of the DAC countries in order to provide a fuller picture of the relationship between bilateral foreign aid and political support between donor and recipient.

III. Data and Estimation

3.1 Descriptions of data and variables

This paper employs a panel for each of the DAC countries with 155 recipient countries from 1991 to 2008. Data is unavailable for each variable in every year so the number of observations in each regression depends on the choice of control variables. Summary statistics and a detailed variable description are provided in Appendices 1 and 2 respectively.

The basic specification is of the empirical model is:

$$\text{Voting Coincidence}_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 \text{LevelODA}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{Democracy}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \text{National Capabilities}_{i,t-1} + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where *i* and *t* are the country and year indices, respectively, α_i represents country fixed effects, and η_t represents time effects. In some specifications, a lagged dependent variable is included.

The dependent variable is Voting Coincidence, a measure of active agreement in policy positions in the UN General Assembly between countries since donor countries may "bribe recipient governments not only to comply, but also to avoid non-compliance" (Dreher et al. 2008). Voting coincidences are based on voting records from the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET), which records all resolutions along with each member's status and voting actions. Voting actions are recorded as 'Yes', 'No', 'Abstentions', and 'Non-Voting'. Voting coincidence is calculated as the ratio of the total number of times two countries' votes match to the number of resolutions with a roll call vote in the same

year.[6] All roll call votes are included because not all votes are similarly important for the countries considered and determining which votes are "important" is subjective.[7] Therefore the general approach for using all votes is preferable to focusing on a subjective set of "important" votes (Wittkopf 1973, Kegley and McGowan 1981, and Dreher et al. 2008).

The key independent variable is the annual amount of a DAC country's ODA as a proportion of total ODA received by the recipient country. This variable assesses the extent to which an aid recipient relies on an individual donor for development assistance (Wang 1999).[8] Aid disbursements rather than commitments are used because disbursements represent an actual transfer of financial resources. Not all commitments are honored by donors, so disbursements are more likely to affect aid recipient behavior (Asiedu and Nandwa 2007).

The other control variables are measurements of democracy and national capability. The democracy variable is a dichotomous dummy variable from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) classifying a country as a democracy or not. It is included because democratic countries vote together (Thacker 1999 and Voeten 2000) and UN voting blocks are relatively stable (Holcombe and Sobel 1996). The national capability variable is a measure of "hard" power, or power obtained through economic or military means as opposed to "soft" power, which is power produced through diplomacy, history, or culture. It is included because stronger countries show foreign policy defiance, possibly resulting in a lower voting coincidence (Wang 1999), and national capability is robustly associated with UN voting behavior (Dreher and Sturm 2006).

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[6] The denominator for voting coincidence is larger when abstentions and absences are included. For example, consider a scenario with fifteen total votes and two countries. When abstentions and absences are included, if country A votes with country B five times, opposite five times, and has three abstentions and two absences, the voting coincidence is 33 percent (5/15). When abstentions and absences are excluded, the voting coincidence is 50 percent (5/10).

[7] Unanimous and near unanimous votes are sometimes excluded because such votes are more likely ceremonial rather than in areas where policy disagreement arises. However, such exclusions are subjective and sometimes these votes have significant meaning for the countries in the minority.

[8] ODA is measured by the OECD as grants + loans – repayment of loans. Net disbursements will be negative for years where repayments on loans made by the recipient country exceed ODA disbursements to that country.

3.2 Methodology

Fixed country and time effects are included in all regressions as specified by the Hausman test. Since the aid measures may be endogenous because aid could adjust to voting patterns (i.e. rewarding aid recipients for "good behavior") and the possibility that voting coincidence and aid are jointly influenced by common determinants (Dreher et al. 2008), various estimation techniques are employed.

Regressions are first estimated with Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) for the non-Nordic countries. Following Kilby (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008), the 2SLS estimation uses "good donor" instruments for the aid variables of the non-Nordic countries as suggested by Fleck and Kilby (2006a and 2006b). The instruments are the ODA variables of the Nordic countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) because their aid is correlated with the aid patterns of the other DAC countries since donors focus on the same set of 'aid darlings' (Theile et al. 2007) and because their aid is not affected by the UN voting behavior of aid recipients (Stokke 1989, Alesina and Dollar 2000, and Gates and Hoeffler 2004).

The difference GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), another method of correcting for possible endogeneity, is employed to check the robustness of the 2SLS results. The GMM results are based on the one-step estimator implemented by Roodman (2006) and use the lagged levels of the regressors as instruments for the first-differenced regressors. For the non-Nordic countries, the "good donor" instruments are also included. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within countries. The Hansen J test is used to determine the validity of the instruments (the null hypothesis is that the instruments as a group are exogenous) and the Arellano-Bond test of second-order autocorrelation, which detects autocorrelation in levels, is used to determine whether the estimator is consistent.[9]

[9] The null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test of second-order autocorrelation is the absence of autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. A higher p-value is preferred.

IV. The Basic Model
4.1 Results

Table 1 reports the results when estimated with 2SLS for the non-Nordic countries.

[Insert Table 1]

The instruments appear valid since the Hansen J statistic does not reject the overidentifying restrictions at conventional levels of significance.[10] The results show a ten percent increase in the share of foreign aid increases voting coincidence by 0.89 percent for Belgium, 0.091 percent for Canada, 0.051 percent for France, 0.126 percent for Germany, 1.389 percent for New Zealand, 0.021 percent for Spain, and 0.076 percent for the United Kingdom. The foreign aid coefficients for Belgium, Canada, France, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom are strongly statistically significant at the 1 percent level while Germany's coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The positive and statistically significant coefficients are expected according to the general hypothesis that countries use foreign aid to increase voting coincidence among aid recipients.

However, Japan has a negative coefficient on aid (-0.022). This result is in-line with Dreher et al. (2008) who find program aid for Japan, which comprises 20.8 percent of Japanese total aid, has a negative effect on voting coincidence. The empirical results also match the negative correlation between average ODA and average voting coincidence (Figure 1).

[Insert Figure 1]

The non-positive coefficient supports the notion in the aid literature that Japan uses its foreign aid for economic rather than political reasons. If so, a measure of voting coincidence in the UN General Assembly may be an inappropriate measure of foreign aid influence for countries using aid to influence factors other than political interests.

Table 2 reports the difference GMM estimates for the basic model and the number of instruments included. For each country except for Portugal, the number of instruments is fewer than the number of

[10] These results are in-line with Dreher et al. (2008) who find the instruments are valid.

groups (countries), satisfying a standard rule of thumb regarding instrument proliferation (Roodman 2006).

[Insert Table 2]

The results show a positive relationship between voting coincidence and foreign aid share for Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, with similar magnitudes and statistical significance (at the 1 percent level) to the 2SLS results. The aid coefficients for Belgium, Germany, and New Zealand turn statistically insignificant. Germany's 2SLS result was statistically weak so adding additional instruments in the estimation may explain the statistical insignificance of the variable of interest. Whereas Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom all rank among the top nine in foreign aid distribution (eighth, third, ninth, and fifth respectively), Belgium and New Zealand rank fourteenth and twenty-second respectively. These results suggest the size of aid distribution may matter in changing voting coincidence.

As expected from the aid literature, the aid coefficient is insignificant for all of the Nordic countries, providing evidence that the Nordic countries grant aid for non-political motivations. Japan again shows a statistically significant negative relationship giving additional credence for Japan using foreign aid for reasons other than political influence. Italy and Finland also show negative relationships between voting coincidence and foreign aid share.[11] Italy's result is in line with Dreher et al. (2008) who find project aid has a negative effect on voting coincidence. Finland's results may be explained by its aid behavior since it focuses its aid to recipients in its geographical region so political considerations may be of second order importance (Gates and Hoeffler 2004).

4.2 Interpretation

The empirical results may differ for countries for two reasons. First, countries pursue multiple objectives when granting aid (Isenman and Ehrenpreis 2003) so political influence may not be of first-order significance. It would be unreasonable to assume each country has the same objectives with their

[11] Like Japan the negative relationship between voting coincidence and foreign aid is seen in the raw data graphs when average ODA is plotted with average voting coincidence over the time period analyzed (see Figure 1).

aid programs, even if the rhetoric of mission statements converges to a few main themes such as poverty reduction.

Second, the results could be interpreted as a lower bound of political influence because of the similar voting coincidence rates among DAC countries (see Table 3) and the possibility of free riding. The high DAC voting coincidences provides an incentive for countries to achieve their political goals by free riding off countries that share their same political goals and also grant foreign aid. The free riding country could further its political agenda without sharing the cost of aid distribution.

This hypothesis is explored using factor analysis, which analyzes the voting patterns of the DAC countries.[12] If the voting patterns of the DAC countries are similar, the argument of free riding is strengthened. The factor analysis condenses all the similarities in the voting patterns for the DAC countries and identifies two significant factors explaining voting groups within the DAC.[13] Factor one (i.e. the DAC factor) explains 81.1 percent of the total variation in voting patterns among all the DAC countries. On average all the DAC countries, except for the United States, have a 91.2 percent correlation with the DAC factor. The United States has a 42.9 percent correlation with the DAC factor. An interpretation of this result is that all 22 DAC countries, even the United States, vote together on most UN roll call votes. This is not surprising since democracies and countries with similar wealth levels tend to vote together.

The second factor (in factor analysis the factors are unrelated) describes the votes where the United States voted contrary to the other DAC countries. This factor (i.e. the Israel factor) explains 4.7 percent of the total variance in DAC countries. The voting behavior of the United States accounts for a large proportion of the variance within this factor and the United States is the only DAC country with a

[12] Factor analysis depends on an ordinal scale of value for the data being analyzed and does not accept missing values. Therefore, two changes were made to the voting data. The first was how the votes were scaled. 'Yes' votes were given a value of 1, 'No' votes were given a value of -1, and 'Abstentions' and 'Non-Voting' were given values of 0 (see Rummel 1970). The second change regards Switzerland. Switzerland did not join the UN until 2002 but because the missing data points need to be assigned a value (i.e. the votes that were cast before Switzerland joined the UN need to be classified), all the roll call votes prior to 2002 for Switzerland were assigned the neutral value of 0. Given Switzerland's historic stance of neutrality on world issues, this assumption seems justified.

[13] Factor analysis produces the same number of factors as variables (22 in this case). However, only the first two factors were kept because their eigenvalues were greater than one, satisfying the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser 1960).

high correlation (78.5 percent) with the factor. The average correlation for the other 21 DAC countries is -2.4 percent. Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom are positively correlated with the Israel factor, just weakly correlated. The correlations provide evidence the United States is the only DAC country that on a semi-consistent basis votes differently from the DAC voting bloc. These different votes specifically concern issues involving Israel. When Israel is included in the factor analysis, the correlation between the United States and the second factor increases to 80.4 percent and Israel's correlation with factor two is 79.5 percent, providing evidence that factor two describes votes when Israel and the United States are in conflict with the other DAC countries.

The results of the factor analysis suggest that if free riding is a significant problem and the regression results represent a lower bound of political influence, countries are unlikely to free ride off the United States and are more likely free ride off of other countries. An effort to identify what countries are free riding and who they are free riding off of may be an attractive avenue of future research.[14]

V. Sensitivity Analyses

This section tests the robustness of the GMM estimation to the inclusion of additional variables suggested in the literature as possible determinants of voting coincidence. These include measures of economic power (GDP per capita and real GDP growth), foreign dependence (external debt), a different measure of "hard" power (the percentage of the labor force who are armed service personnel), and international trade patterns (imports and exports). The final robustness check collapses the yearly panel into three-year averages to analyze long-term trends and smooth out business cycles and international shocks, which may affect aid allocation.

Measures of economic power, foreign dependence, and "hard" power are included because stronger countries with easy access to capital may be less likely accept bribes and less likely to vote with DAC countries compared to countries who have constrained access to private capital and may need

[14]In related research, Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006) find evidence that donors view the contributions of other countries as complementary but uncover no evidence of cooperative behavior among countries.

public support such as foreign aid (Dreher et al. 2008). However, dependence may be higher in times of crises, making it more difficult to access private capital. Therefore, less economically secure countries may need more assistance from economically stronger countries in these times, particularly when dealing with debt issues (Edwards 2003 and Cassimon and Campenhout 2007.) Thus, while these measures may be important determinants of voting coincidence, their impact on voting patterns is *a priori* ambiguous.

International trade patterns may also be important to voting coincidence since trade measures foreign influence (Stone 2004) and creates similar preferences among trading partners and greater cooperation (Oneal and Russet 1999). This increased dependency may increase a country's responsiveness to external pressure, leading to voting compliance with the trading partner, particularly if the trading partner is large, or if the recipient fears losing access to the markets of the donor (Keohane 1967). However, strong economic ties with developed countries may create feelings of exploitation and could reduce voting coincidence (Kim and Russett 1996). Again, while trade may be important, its impact on voting patterns is *a priori* ambiguous.

Table 4 includes GDP per capita as a measure of economic wealth.

[Insert Table 4]

The basic GMM results hold as a ten percent increase in the share of foreign aid increases voting coincidence by 0.058 percent for Canada, 0.021 percent for France, 0.015 percent or Spain, and 0.031 percent for the United Kingdom, all similar magnitudes to the basic model. The aid coefficients for the Nordic countries are again statistically insignificant. Japan, Italy, and Finland each maintain their negative coefficients on aid and with similar magnitudes to the basic model.

Table 5 includes real GDP growth as a measure of economic progress.

[Insert Table 5]

The basic result for the variable of interest holds. Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom have positive and statistically significant coefficients on the foreign aid variable with almost identical coefficient sizes as the basic model. Japan, Italy, and Finland keep their negative coefficients, though the

Hansen J statistic suggests the instruments for Italy may not be valid in this specification. The aid coefficients for the Nordic countries are statistically insignificant.

Table 6 contains external debt as a measure of foreign dependence. The results show external debt is more important than the other economic power variables.

[Insert Table 6]

The coefficient on external debt is statistically significant and positive for 9 of the 22 countries, giving support to the hypothesis of Dreher et al. (2008) that a country with more debt may have a greater reliance on foreign aid and would increase its voting coincidence with the donor country. The basic results for the foreign aid variables are similar to earlier specifications. Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom have positive and statistically significant coefficients on the variable of interest, the Nordic countries have statistically insignificant coefficients on the variable of interest, and Japan, Italy, Finland, and Portugal and statistically significant negative coefficients on the aid variables. While Portugal's results match the raw data (see Figure 1), the results are suspect because the number of instruments is greater than the number of groups, as evidenced by the high Hansen J statistic.

Table 7 employs another measure of "hard" power, the percentage of the labor force that is armed service personnel (AFPTL).

[Insert Table 7]

Like the argument for national capability, the more formidable a country's military is the more likely it can be politically independent and reduce its voting coincidence with donor countries. The coefficient is the expected negative sign but only statistically significant for Austria and Greece. The coefficients for foreign aid are analogous with previous specifications.

Table 8 includes imports and Table 9 includes exports as measures of international trade.

[Insert Table 8]

[Insert Table 9]

While the export measure is statistically significant in seven of the DAC countries, the imports measure is statistically significant in only two countries. The coefficients for foreign aid are similar with previous specifications.

The final robustness check collapses the yearly panel into three-year averages and is estimated with the difference GMM estimator (Table 10). Switzerland is dropped because of a lack of observations.

[Insert Table 10]

The results confirm the basic results for Canada, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the Nordic countries. They also show some different results. Belgium, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, and the United States have positive and statistically significant coefficients for the variable of interest while negative coefficients on the variable of interest for Finland and Italy turn statistically insignificant. The results for Ireland and Portugal should be considered with caution because the Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation suggests autocorrelation is present. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the United States' aid variable suggests the United States uses aid for political influence but that its influence is only seen in the long-run. This result may help reconcile the conflicting results found in the aid literature concerning whether aid increases voting coincidence with the United States.

VI. Conclusion

This paper empirically tests the hypothesis that aid recipients adopt donor preferences by voting more frequently with donors in United Nations General Assembly roll call votes after receiving foreign aid. This paper extends the previous research on the political influence of foreign aid by expanding the donor countries considered and testing the long-run political influence of foreign aid on voting coincidence. These extensions were chosen for two reasons. First, while each of the DAC countries has a significant foreign aid program according to the OECD, most previous research focused on a smaller sub-set of donors. Second, previous research shows mixed results as to whether the United States successfully increases voting coincidence with its aid. The estimation procedure employs instrument variable and difference GMM estimation to account for the possible endogenous nature of foreign aid.

The results provide evidence the foreign aid of Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom increases voting coincidence and affirm previous literature that the Nordic countries of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden do not use aid for political reasons. The results also provide an explanation for why previous studies are mixed in their conclusions as to whether the United States uses aid for political support. When yearly panels are estimated, the results do not show evidence the United States uses aid for political support. However, when the yearly panels are collapsed into three-year averages, voting coincidence increases with the United States. The results are robust to the inclusion of variables measuring economic and military power, dependence on foreign support, and international trade patterns.

The empirical results may be interpreted as a lower bound of political influence because donor countries with similar voting coincidences may engage in free riding behavior. This leads to some possible future research opportunities. Do donors seek to maximize their international influence across multiple international organizations or do they focus on a subset? Do countries free ride in securing influence in one organization so they can devote their resources to influencing another organization? Also, does free riding affect how much aid donors give?

The results do not offer clear policy conclusions. To some extent, aid distribution is politically motivated by donor interests and donors have been slow to reform. This is particularly true if such reforms are not in the best interests of the donors, especially if donors derive utility from the political gain aid donations may secure. Therefore, the slow progress of reform should serve as a caution to plans of quickly removing political components of aid. Increasing the transparency of aid practices may be the most reasonable and effective goal for reformers to pursue. Transparency may increase donor accountability and the incentives for donors at the margin may shift from political considerations to the humanitarian needs of the recipient. Such a change would align the reasons donors claim to give aid with their actions.

Figure 1: Official Development Assistance and Voting Coincidence for Select Countries 1991-2008



Table 1: Bilateral ODA and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries (2SLS)

Variable	United States	Japan	France	Germany	United Kingdon	Italy	Canada	Spain	Australia
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.0001	-0.0022	0.0051	0.0126	0.0076	-0.0849	0.0091	0.0021	0.0424
	(0.0001)	(0.0004)***	(0.0009)***	(0.0077)*	(0.0013)***	(0.0533)	(0.0019)***	(0.0003)***	(0.7741)
Democracy (*t* -1)	0.0178	0.7829	0.5726	0.3068	0.7283	-0.8064	0.0976	0.4996	0.1175
	(0.7900)	(1.9228)	(1.5324)	(1.7836)	(1.6132)	(1.7434)	(1.8263)	(1.9581)	(1.8788)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	1.4515	0.3592	-0.1703	0.0266	0.1351	0.0659	0.0928	-0.0876	-0.1837
	(1.0310)	(0.2455)	(0.2094)	(0.2527)	(0.2226)	(0.2483)	(0.2503)	(0.2549)	(0.2930)
R-squared (within)	0.63	0.15	0.13	0.18	0.27	0.22	0.13	0.09	0.40
Number of countries	102	101	102	102	101	100	102	95	80
Number of observations	1206	1239	1254	1256	1224	1161	1248	1051	796
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.50	0.45	0.50	0.97	0.94	0.38	0.99	0.40	0.16

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Variable	Belgium	Switzerland	Austria	Finland	Portugal	Ireland	Greece	Luxembourg	New Zealand
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.0890	-0.0056	0.0241	-1.5065	-0.9263	-1.9144	0.0337	-2.6871	1.3894
	(0.0216)***	(0.8557)	(0.1644)	(1.2636)	(1.8635)	(4.2058)	(5.7893)	(3.0428)	(0.2238)***
Democracy (*t* -1)	-0.1829	2.1702	-1.7613	2.3419	-0.0163	1.8459	0.2943	-0.8804	1.6839
	(1.8565)	(3.4449)	(3.5030)	(1.6378)	(5.0694)	(2.0091)	(1.6692)	(1.671)	(1.5937)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	0.2799	-0.3684	-0.0979	0.0628	0.2239	-0.0875	0.3109	0.0095	-0.3124
	(0.2244)	(0.5303)	(0.2175)	(0.2528)	(0.5088)	(0.6797)	(0.7238)	(0.5799)	(0.3344)
R-squared (within)	0.14	0.14	0.11	0.17	0.07	0.14	0.10	0.08	0.16
Number of countries	100	91	123	96	61	92	76	88	75
Number of observations	1153	532	822	1101	356	1008	505	867	815
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.44	0.15	0.18	0.19	0.37	0.24	0.24	0.42	0.64

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Table 2: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries (GMM)

Variable	United States	Japan	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Netherlands	Italy	Canada	Spain	Norway	Sweden
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.1522	0.0871	0.1527	0.1846	0.1437	0.2187	0.2660	0.2091	0.1451	0.2117	0.1946
	(0.1291)	(0.1081)	(0.1074)	(0.1119)*	(0.1107)	(0.0737)***	(0.1116)**	(0.1052)**	(0.1057)	(0.0885)**	(0.0909)**
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.0001	-0.0011	0.0024	0.0006	0.0037	0.0411	-0.0930	0.0069	0.0017	-1.6652	0.2574
	(0.0001)	(0.0004)***	(0.0008)***	(0.0146)	(0.0014)***	(0.0529)	(0.0343)***	(0.0021)***	(0.0005)***	(1.1997)	(0.4434)
Democracy (*t* -1)	1.2969	0.5989	1.2876	1.8322	1.9309	3.5134	1.9254	0.0231	1.5409	2.4761	3.9890
	(1.0102)	(2.2146)	(2.0791)	(2.2840)	(2.2344)	(2.5630)	(2.6632)	(0.0218)	(2.4864)	(2.8484)	(2.9096)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	0.7211	0.5244	0.0462	0.5734	-0.1297	-0.2511	-0.2314	0.8712	-0.8183	1.1745	-0.6298
	(0.8888)	(1.1886)	(1.1357)	(1.0335)	(0.9686)	(1.3068)	(0.9401)	(1.1477)	(0.7679)	(2.2626	(1.3881)
Number of countries	98	97	98	98	97	139	97	98	92	125	124
Number of observations	1010	1041	1057	1061	1025	1790	944	1054	855	1580	1580
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.11	0.38	0.57	0.23	0.54	0.17	0.41	0.29	0.48	0.22	0.14
Number of instruments	53	53	53	53	53	34	53	53	53	34	34
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.29	0.56	0.14	0.11	0.14	0.02	0.12	0.13	0.26	0.10	0.03

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Variable	Denmark	Australia	Belgium	Switzerland	Austria	Finland	Portugal	Ireland	Greece	Luxembourg	New Zealand
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.2956	0.1137	0.0915	0.1265	-0.0771	0.2273	0.1543	0.1579	0.0804	0.1457	0.0615
	(0.0868)***	(0.1196)	(0.1101)	(0.1302)	(0.1507)	(0.1222)*	(0.1397)	(0.1249)	(0.0707)	(0.0867)*	(0.1169)
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.4241	-0.0330	0.0326	0.0535	-0.0826	-2.7679	-0.7211	-1.6281	-0.2867	-0.9907	-0.9639
	(0.6543)	(2.7518)	(0.0232)	(0.7240)	(0.2239)	(0.8163)***	(0.4966)	(1.7734)	(0.3400)	(0.9020)	(3.3671)
Democracy (*t* -1)	2.7669	-1.1876	-0.5124	5.0319	11.2934	0.7342	0.6909	0.9546	0.7053	3.3701	2.2978
	(2.7804)	2.7518	(3.5414)	(2.3755)**	(4.4379)***	(3.0578)	(3.1986)	(2.6288)	(1.9611)	(3.4052)	(3.6003)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	-0.5805	2.4593	0.6459	0.0101	-0.1510	0.1781	1.1981	0.3443	-1.2606	0.9460	-0.4846
	(1.1134)	(2.4323)	(1.2381)	(0.8163)	(0.2147)	(1.2978)	(3.2817	(1.0216)	(1.5186)	(1.5167)	(1.2981)
Number of countries	113	68	96	83	107	89	51	88	65	85	69
Number of observations	1233	629	945	348	338	913	219	832	366	655	665
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.06	0.65	0.64	0.65	0.24	0.716	0.69	0.01	0.28	0.36	0.91
Number of instruments	34	53	53	21	53	53	53	53	38	53	53
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.12	0.47	0.15	0.52	0.53	0.26	0.86	0.07	0.17	0.28	0.16

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Table 3: Average Voting Coincidence Rates Among Development Assistance Committee Countries from 1991 to 2008

	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Italy	Japan	Luxembourg	Netherlands	New Zealand	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	United Kingdom	United States
Australia	1.00																					
Austria	0.84	1.00																				
Belgium	0.81	0.92	1.00																			
Canada	0.86	0.86	0.87	1.00																		
Denmark	0.82	0.93	0.95	0.88	1.00																	
Finland	0.83	0.94	0.95	0.89	0.95	1.00																
France	0.72	0.82	0.86	0.76	0.83	0.83	1.00															
Germany	0.80	0.91	0.97	0.87	0.94	0.95	0.85	1.00														
Greece	0.78	0.88	0.87	0.80	0.89	0.88	0.78	0.87	1.00													
Ireland	0.82	0.95	0.89	0.83	0.91	0.91	0.81	0.90	0.87	1.00												
Italy	0.81	0.93	0.96	0.87	0.95	0.94	0.85	0.96	0.88	0.91	1.00											
Japan	0.79	0.87	0.84	0.82	0.87	0.86	0.74	0.84	0.80	0.85	0.85	1.00										
Luxembourg	0.81	0.92	0.98	0.88	0.96	0.96	0.86	0.97	0.88	0.90	0.96	0.85	1.00									
Netherlands	0.80	0.91	0.97	0.88	0.96	0.95	0.85	0.97	0.87	0.89	0.96	0.85	0.97	1.00								
New Zealand	0.86	0.89	0.85	0.82	0.87	0.87	0.76	0.84	0.82	0.91	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.85	1.00							
Norway	0.82	0.92	0.93	0.88	0.95	0.94	0.81	0.92	0.87	0.90	0.93	0.85	0.94	0.93	0.96	1.00						
Portugal	0.83	0.93	0.94	0.86	0.95	0.93	0.83	0.94	0.90	0.92	0.96	0.85	0.94	0.94	0.86	0.93	1.00					
Spain	0.82	0.92	0.92	0.84	0.93	0.90	0.83	0.91	0.92	0.90	0.93	0.84	0.92	0.91	0.85	0.91	0.95	1.00				
Sweden	0.82	0.95	0.91	0.86	0.93	0.94	0.80	0.91	0.86	0.95	0.91	0.87	0.92	0.91	0.90	0.92	0.91	0.89	1.00			
Switzerland	0.75	0.95	0.93	0.81	0.93	0.95	0.83	0.94	0.92	0.93	0.94	0.86	0.94	0.94	0.90	0.94	0.92	0.92	0.92	1.00		
United Kingdom	0.71	0.80	0.85	0.77	0.84	0.83	0.90	0.85	0.76	0.79	0.84	0.75	0.85	0.86	0.75	0.82	0.83	0.81	0.80	0.81	1.00	
United States	0.38	0.36	0.39	0.40	0.39	0.37	0.44	0.39	0.33	0.34	0.39	0.33	0.39	0.40	0.32	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.36	0.29	0.51	1.00

Note: Values range from 0.00 to 1.00 with a value of 0.00 interpreted as the two countries never voting in agreement and a value of 1.00 interpreted as two countries voting in full agreement.

Table 4: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including GDP Per Capita (GMM)

Variable	United States	Japan	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Netherlands	Italy	Canada	Spain	Norway	Sweden
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.1137	0.0701	0.1145	0.1382	0.1111	0.2081	0.2157	0.1736	0.1475	0.1891	01592
	(0.1299)	(0.1089)	(0.1062)	(0.1119)	(0.1088)	(0.0729)***	(0.1111)**	(0.1061)*	(0.1115)	(0.0917)**	(0.0928)*
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.0001	-0.0009	0.0021	-0.0016	0.0031	0.0420	-0.0937	0.0058	0.0015	-0.7016	01748
	(0.0001)	(0.0005)**	(0.0009)***	(0.0157)	(0.0015)**	(0.0517)	(0.0380)**	(0.0022)***	(0.0005)***	(1.0401)	(0.3226)
Democracy (*t* -1)	1.3072	0.5139	1.2005	1.6262	1.9634	3.3467	1.6909	2.0519	1.5837	2.8616	3.8062
	(1.0041)	(2.2019)	(2.0075)	(2.1852)	(2.1864)	(2.5394)	(2.5266)	(2.0993)	(2.5134)	(2.7367)	(2.8286)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	1.1066	-0.3084	-0.6934	-0.2617	-0.7301	-0.4009	-1.0491	0.1136	-1.3602	0.2623	-0.7326
	(1.1073)	0.8644)	(0.7913)	(0.9145)	(0.8047)	(1.0436)	(0.8925)	(0.8298)	(0.7472)*	(1.4088)	(1.0179)
GDPC (*t* -1)	-0.0001	0.0040	0.0027	0.0023	0.0033	-0.0007	0.0039	0.0029	0.0033	0.0001	-0.0011
	(0.0010)	(0.0025)	(0.0019)	(0.0025)	(0.0025)	(0.0018)	(0.0028)	(0.0020)	(0.0025)	(0.0055)	(0.0031)
Number of countries	96	93	93	93	93	131	92	93	88	119	116
Number of observations	966	1005	1006	1010	976	1690	901	1003	837	1488	1483
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.16	0.46	0.83	0.39	0.77	0.15	0.55	0.34	0.51	0.20	0.30
Number of instruments	54	54	54	54	54	35	54	54	54	35	35
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.32	0.57	0.13	0.19	0.12	0.01	0.04	0.13	0.36	0.03	0.08

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Variable	Denmark	Australia	Belgium	Switzerland	Austria	Finland	Portugal	Ireland	Greece	Luxembourg	New Zealand
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.2508	0.0687	0.0729	0.1646	-0.0999	0.1652	0.1587	0.0901	0.0949	0.1547	0.0164
	(0.0882)***	(0.1126)	(0.1063)	(0.1444)	(0.1459)	(0.1224)	(0.1259)	(0.1317)	(0.0674)	(0.0881)*	(0.1301)
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.2707	-0.0612	0.0258	0.3948	-0.0584	-2.2697	-0.7446	-1.7699	-0.1704	-0.8338	2.0843
	(0.5335)	(0.0988)	(0.0265)	(0.9006)	(0.2197)	(1.0101)**	(0.4757)	(1.8301)	(0.2998)	(0.7635)	(2.9717)
Democracy (*t* -1)	2.6348	-0.9583	-0.5834	5.4206	10.797	0.9213	0.9987	1.1637	0.9208	3.4637	2.7120
	(2.6548)	(2.6631)	(3.5051)	(2.5567)**	(4.4116)**	2.9344	(3.1736)	(2.4809)	(1.9823)	(3.3889)	(3.4698)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	-0.6729	1.8749	0.1384	0.0789	-0.0459	-0.8048	-0.9810	-0.0016	-2.4703	0.4442	-1.4392
	(0.8638)	(2.0534)	(1.1818)	(0.9843)	(0.2609)	(0.8818)	(3.0897)	(1.0583)	(1.8401)	(1.0704)	(0.9246)
GDPC (*t* -1)	-0.0000	0.0007	0.0036	0.0025	-0.0034	0.0034	0.0145	0.0007	0.0111	-0.0029	0.0052
	(0.0032)	(0.0036)	(0.0024)	(0.0040)	(0.0031)	(0.0026)	(0.0075)*	(0.0046)	(0.0062)*	(0.0034)	(0.0024)
Number of countries	108	64	92	78	102	84	48	84	61	80	65
Number of observations	1178	586	917	325	320	864	207	788	347	617	626
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.06	0.56	0.60	0.62	0.29	0.84	0.58	0.03	0.49	0.23	0.99
Number of instruments	35	54	54	22	54	54	48	54	39	54	54
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.24	0.40	0.16	0.56	0.37	0.21	0.93	0.14	0.07	0.45	0.12

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Table 5: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including GDP Growth (GMM)

Variable	United States	Japan	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Netherlands	Italy	Canada	Spain	Norway	Sweden
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.1173	0.0667	0.1125	0.1396	0.1032	0.2141	0.2151	0.1709	0.1440	0.1833	0.1604
	(0.1293)	(0.1099)	(0.1075)	(0.1131)	(0.1111)	(00743)***	(0.1137)*	(0.1059)	(0.1114)	(0.0864)**	(0.0925)*
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.0001	-0.0012	0.0025	-0.0003	0.0038	0.0424	-0.0949	0.0069	0.0018	-0.6809	0.1623
	(0.0001)	(0.0005)***	(0.0008)***	(0.0159)	(0.0015)***	(0.0519)	(0.0357)***	(0.0021)***	(0.0005)***	(1.1065)	(0.3189)
Democracy (*t* -1)	1.3044	0.6421	1.3246	1.8004	2.0212	3.5788	1.8144	2.1788	1.7111	3.0294	4.0215
	(0.9902	(2.1886)	(1.9518)	(2.1096)	(2.1135)	(2.4863)	(2.4725)	(2.0350)	(2.4603)	(2.6712)	(2.7664)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	0.7372	0.0889	-0.4548	0.04978	-0.4058	-0.6127	-0.4875	0.4464	-0.7817	0.1462	-1.0692
	(0.9149)	(0.9412)	(0.7909)	(0.8998)	(0.7914)	(1.0138)	(0.7868)	(0.8402)	(0.8051)	(1.5984)	(1.1345)
GDP Growth (*t* -1)	-0.0386	-0.0491	-0.0804	-0.1124	-0.0658	-0.1301	-0.1063	-0.0832	-0.0913	-0.1316	-0.1725
	(0.0292)	(0.0833)	(0.0535)	(0.0727)	(0.0581)	(0.0795)	(0.0912)	(0.0671)	(0.0851)	(0.0985)	(0.0756)
Number of countries	95	96	96	96	96	134	95	96	90	123	120
Number of observations	978	1021	1022	1026	992	1713	912	1019	845	1516	1511
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.20	0.60	0.98	0.55	0.98	0.19	0.74	0.52	0.60	0.05	0.40
Number of instuments	54	54	54	54	54	35	54	54	54	35	35
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.42	0.57	0.11	0.16	0.16	0.01	0.06	0.18	0.26	0.05	0.06

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Variable	Denmark	Australia	Belgium	Switzerland	Austria	Finland	Portugal	Ireland	Greece	Luxembourg	New Zealand
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.2609	0.0882	0.0675	0.1461	-0.0554	0.1664	0.1502	0.0947	0.0624	0.2001	0.0084
	(0.0868)***	(0.1130)	(0.1086)	(0.1661)	(0.1725)	(0.1258)	(0.1354)	(0.1311)	(0.0662)	(0.0994)**	(0.1290)
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.4460	-0.0705	0.0335	0.3152	-0.0479	-2.3101	-0.7459	-1.9289	-0.2195	-0.9821	1.7258
	(0.6566)	(0.0923)	(0.0264)	(0.7281)	(0.2065)	(0.9840)**	(0.5109)	(1.6865)	(0.3209)	(0.7831)	(3.0917)
Democracy (*t* -1)	2.7510	-0.9716	-0.5455	5.5184	10.8386	0.9432	0.3436	1.3253	0.8615	3.8979	2.6348
	(2.6695)	(2.5850)	(3.5039)	(2.5179)**	(4.3368)***	(2.8679)	(3.2956)	(2.3814)	(1.9442)	(2.2461)	(3.5058)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	-0.8702	1.7838	0.7366	0.0327	-0.0580	-0.6000	1.0325	0.0837	-1.3814	-0.1692	-0.9129
	(1.0397)	(1.9137)	(1.2781)	(0.8003)	(0.2829)	(0.8522)	(3.2607)	(0.8438)	(1.7738)	(0.90419)	(0.8768)
GDP Growth (*t* -1)	-0.0630	-0.1019	-0.0388	-0.0255	0.3138	-0.0894	0.1439	-0.1306	-0.0359	-0.1692	0.0048
	(0.0927)	(0.0952)	(0.0657)	(0.1876)	(0.0950)***	(0.0791)	(0.1322)	(0.0848)	(0.1696)	(0.9042)	(0.1284)
Number of countries	111	66	94	80	104	87	49	86	63	93	67
Number of observations	1193	601	924	336	322	878	214	800	355	627	641
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.09	0.53	0.47	0.62	0.26	0.79	0.66	0.03	0.14	0.44	0.86
Number of instruments	35	54	54	22	54	54	54	54	39	54	54
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.25	0.46	0.20	0.60	0.49	0.21	0.87	0.17	0.19	0.82	0.15

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Table 6: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including External Debt (GMM)

Variable	United States	Japan	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Netherlands	Italy	Canada	Spain	Norway	Sweden
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.0346	0.0215	0.0705	0.0980	0.0356	0.1533	0.1496	0.1203	0.0714	0.1361	0.0912
	(0.1393)	(0.1202)	(0.1130)	(0.1263)	(0.1235)	(0.0729)**	(0.1374)	(0.1184)	(0.1143)	(0.0824)*	(0.0919)
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.0001	-0.0011	0.0024	-0.0013	0.0035	0.0492	-0.0850	0.0063	0.0016	-0.0433	0.2269
	(0.0001)	(0.0004)***	(0.0008)***	(0.1584)	(0.0013)***	(0.0565)	(0.0374)**	(0.0019)***	(0.0005)***	(0.9377)	(0.3307)
Democracy (*t* -1)	1.1914	0.6319	1.2373	1.6776	2.0491	3.1799	1.7416	2.0976	1.6129	3.3808	3.5652
	(1.0306)	(2.2389)	(2.0106)	(2.1931)	(2.1768)	(2.5501)	(2.4835)	(2.0763)	(2.4656)	(2.8248)	(2.8062)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	1.3839	0.7610	-0.1253	0.3708	-0.0684	-0.5169	0.2171	0.8089	-0.2824	0.0413	-0.6820
	(1.2875)	(1.2292)	(0.9092)	(0.9869)	(0.9963)	(0.9828)	(0.9224)	(1.0245)	(0.8279)	(1.3456)	(1.0719)
External Debt (*t* -1)	0.0063	-0.0031	0.0185	0.0191	0.0189	0.0131	-0.0017	0.0248	0.0000	0.0125	0.0039
	(0.0039)*	(0.0130)	(0.0101)*	(0.0107)*	(0.0099)*	(0.0129)	(0.0117)	(0.0134)*	(0.0155)	(0.0112)	(0.0144)
Number of countries	90	90	90	90	90	115	89	91	85	107	109
Number of observations	918	958	961	963	928	1545	861	955	796	1392	1386
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.40	0.86	0.79	0.62	0.63	0.08	0.85	0.68	0.88	0.10	0.23
Number of instruments	54	54	54	54	54	35	54	54	54	35	35
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.21	0.46	0.11	0.14	0.33	0.02	0.07	0.10	0.16	0.01	0.06

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Variable	Denmark	Australia	Belgium	Switzerland	Austria	Finland	Portugal	Ireland	Greece	Luxembourg	New Zealand
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.2211	0.0285	0.0396	0.0656	-0.2677	0.1047	0.0081	-0.0213	0.0587	0.1243	-0.0704
	(0.0988)**	(0.1459)	(0.1141)	(0.1416)	(0.1013)***	(0.1418)	(0.2251)	(0.1388)	(0.06749)	(0.1063)	(0.1510)
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.3893	-0.0398	0.03363	0.3911	-0.0939	-2.1713	-0.5647	-1.9656	-0.3086	-0.6756	0.2120
	(0.5959)	(0.0889)	(0.0218)	(0.6711)	(0.2023)	(0.8823)**	(0.2339)**	(1.7354)	(0.3289)	(0.6145)	(3.5249)
Democracy (*t* -1)	2.5493	-0.8621	-0.5665	4.4393	11.6869	0.8691	-0.0977	1.5286	2.1206	3.9513	2.8335
	(2.7300)	(2.5628)	(3.5802)	(2.4150)*	(4.4239)***	(2.9832)	(4.4798)	(2.3813)	(2.0395)	(3.5499)	(3.3168)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	-0.4422	2.2306	1.0567	0.1592	-0.0505	-0.2390	1.8054	0.3786	-0.1549	0.2757	-0.1303
	(1.0776)	(2.1975)	(1.4109)	(0.8593)	(0.2532)	(0.8342)	(3.2045)	(0.9093)	(1.0759)	(0.9286)	(1.2774)
External Debt (*t* -1)	0.0192	0.0004	0.0008	0.0591	-0.0215	0.0217	-0.0529	0.0269	0.0974	0.0295	0.0037
	(0.0100)*	(0.0146)	(0.01465)	(0.0129)***	(0.0334)	(0.0102)**	(0.0217)**	(0.0137)	(0.0407)**	(0.0279)	(0.0310)
Number of countries	102	61	89	75	87	81	45	82	60	77	63
Number of observations	1125	560	872	308	282	816	182	749	339	576	604
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.09	0.42	0.43	0.75	0.63	0.59	0.41	0.14	0.56	0.18	0.45
Number of instruments	35	54	54	22	54	54	54	54	39	54	54
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.19	0.35	0.15	0.26	0.43	0.37	0.99	0.21	0.17	0.46	0.19

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Table 7: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including AFPTL (GMM)

Variable	United States	Japan	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Netherlands	Italy	Canada	Spain	Norway	Sweden
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.1583	0.1044	0.1406	0.1769	0.1425	0.2415	0.2379	0.2059	0.1363	0.2393	0.1953
	(0.1327)	(0.1079)	(0.1067)	(0.1114)	(0.1122)	(0.0776)***	(0.1146)*	(0.1067)*	(0.1110)	(0.0895)***	(0.0933)**
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.0001	-0.0011	0.0025	0.0013	0.0037	0.0297	-0.0884	0.0068	0.0017	-1.6968	0.1191
	(0.0001)	(0.0004)***	(0.0008)***	(0.0147)	(0.0014)***	(0.0389)	(0.0398)**	(0.0021)***	(0.0005)***	(1.3442)	(0.3209)
Democracy (*t* -1)	1.2436	0.5868	1.3040	1.7496	2.0516	3.5658	1.8696	2.3033	1.5496	2.5779	4.1171
	(1.0141)	(2.3286)	(2.1307)	(2.3619)	(2.2344)	(2.6676)	(2.5837)	(2.2505)	(2.4928)	(2.9782)	(2.9689)
AFPTL (*t* -1)	0.0208	-0.0033	-0.1455	0.0242	-0.1108	-0.3520	-0.1789	0.1205	-0.2211	-0.0521	-05103
	(0.1008)	(0.2981)	(0.2191)	(0.2594)	(0.2151)	(0.6692)	(0.2477)	(0.2756)	(0.2287)	(0.4490)	(0.6085)
Number of countries	96	97	98	98	97	134	96	98	91	122	120
Number of observations	992	994	1004	1006	977	1685	900	999	818	1476	1492
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.11	0.37	0.78	0.36	0.61	0.17	0.48	0.38	0.48	0.23	0.12
Number of instruments	53	53	53	53	53	34	53	53	53	34	34
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.23	0.32	0.30	0.18	0.13	0.01	0.24	0.22	0.15	0.26	0.04

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Variable	Denmark	Australia	Belgium	Switzerland	Austria	Finland	Portugal	Ireland	Greece	Luxembourg	New Zealand
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.2977	0.1270	0.1037	0.1309	0.0032	0.1958	0.1611	0.1147	0.0528	0.1237	0.0629
	(0.0869)***	(0.1299)	(0.1127)	(0.1546)	(0.1510)	(0.1195)*	(0.1272)	(0.1232)	(0.0664)	(0.0804)	(0.1201)
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.3750	-0.08603	0.0348	0.3958	0.0392	-2.4398	-0.4856	-1.8205	-0.2655	-0.8763	-0.1679
	(0.6289)	(0.0719)	(0.0231)	(0.7563)	(0.1874)	(0.9259)***	(0.2516)*	(1.7251)	(0.3033)	(0.7925)	(3.6756)
Democracy (*t* -1)	2.7985	-1.8135	-0.5053	5.1854	6.2454	0.8725	0.4722	0.8592	0.8921	3.3649	2.1501
	(2.9044)	(2.9809)	(3.5538)	(2.9467)*	(4.7787)	(2.9949)	(3.2748)	(2.5389)	(1.9453)	(3.3449)	(3.8679)
AFPTL (*t* -1)	0.1661	-0.0225	-0.0919	0.0001	-1.9663	-0.0536	-2.1374	-0.1518	-1.1500	-0.2029	-0.5096
	(0.3016)	(0.2490)	(0.2314)	(0.2799)	(0.8611)**	(0.2607)	(1.7412)	(0.2955)	(0.6929)*	(0.3372)	(0.4062)
Number of countries	113	66	96	80	105	89	48	87	64	84	68
Number of observations	1158	590	907	310	373	870	205	790	336	617	630
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.12	0.58	0.74	0.34	0.16	0.84	0.83	0.02	0.37	0.28	0.99
Number of instruments	34	53	53	21	53	53	53	53	38	53	53
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.19	0.29	0.21	0.53	0.42	0.09	0.94	0.11	0.17	0.42	0.20

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Table 8: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including Imports (GMM)

Variable	United States	Japan	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Netherlands	Italy	Canada	Spain	Norway	Sweden
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.0507	-0.0052	0.0593	0.0642	0.0391	0.1859	0.1507	0.0727	0.1005	0.1412	0.1237
	(0.1425)	(0.1135)	(0.1114)	(0.1160)	(0.1144)	(0.0797)**	(0.1236)	(0.1059)	(0.1193)	(0.0968)	(0.1029)
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.0001	-0.0010	0.0026	-0.0016	0.0031	0.0014	-0.0836	0.0065	0.0017	-0.2393	0.0148
	(0.0001)	(0.0005)**	(0.0007)***	(0.0159)	(0.0016)**	(0.0021)	(0.0337)***	(0.0021)***	(0.0005)***	(0.1678)	(0.0121)
Democracy (*t* -1)	1.5166	0.4832	1.1752	1.5869	2.3527	3.7753	1.9007	1.8686	1.4849	3.5471	4.1075
	(1.0301)	(2.2848)	(2.0449)	(2.1817)	(2.2339)	(2.5756)	(2.5419)	(2.0903)	(2.5273)	(2.7396)	(2.8183)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	1.5046	-0.1035	-0.3911	-0.1266	-0.4589	-0.5718	-0.4689	0.5239	-1.0318	0.2816	-0.6951
	(1.2915)	(0.9481)	(0.8096)	(1.1201)	(0.7452)	(0.9944)	(0.8193)	(0.8693)	(0.8873)	(1.1883)	(1.0488)
Imports (*t* -1)	-0.0002	-0.0003	0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0007	0.0002	0.0011	-0.0022	-0.0018	-0.0061	-0.0000
	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0009)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0009)	(0.0020)	(0.0018)	(0.0034)	(0.0024)
Number of countries	78	78	78	78	78	112	77	78	73	101	98
Number of observations	806	839	847	844	811	1400	751	828	707	1245	1220
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.17	0.75	0.99	0.65	0.89	0.12	0.84	0.61	0.63	0.03	0.18
Number of instruments	54	54	54	54	54	50	54	54	54	50	50
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.43	0.69	0.28	0.38	0.25	0.13	0.31	0.15	0.30	0.28	0.16

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Variable	Denmark	Australia	Belgium	Switzerland	Austria	Finland	Portugal	Ireland	Greece	Luxembourg	New Zealand
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.2015	0.0715	0.0964	0.1225	-0.1091	0.0784	0.1779	-0.0749	0.0783	0.1110	-0.0013
	(0.0909)**	(0.1208)	(0.1469)	(0.1761)	(0.1416)	(0.1213)	(0.1569)	(0.1213)	(0.0847)	(0.1025)	(0.1350)
Level ODA (*t* -1)	-0.1036	-0.0786	-0.1578	0.1429	-0.1235	-2.4645	-0.5833	-2.6753	-0.1065	-0.2341	0.8533
	(0.0945)	(0.0724)	(0.2327)	(1.6622)	(0.2209)	(0.7010)***	(0.2419)**	(0.9108)***	(0.2464)	(1.7912)	(2.6932)
Democracy (*t* -1)	2.8989	-2.0019	-2.1322	4.3672	11.7087	1.0790	-0.6479	1.9319	0.4295	14.3302	2.9715
	(2.6266)	(2.9029)	(4.2636)	(2.6959)	(4.5504)***	(3.0885)	(5.3539)	(2.2685)	(2.1758)	(5.1336)***	(3.7067)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	0.4832	1.9219	-0.0167	-0.4585	-0.0763	-0.1157	1.6804	-0.0709	-2.9824	-0.1169	-0.7611
	(1.1407/	(2.1950)	(1.2651)	(1.1672)	(0.2721)	(0.8178)	(4.0940)	(0.9067)	(3.1889)	(1.1537)	(0.9374)
Imports (*t* -1)	-0.0039	1.6361	-0.0304	0.0033	-7.3872	-0.2899	0.0062	-0.4459	-0.7339	-0.0144	-9.9162
	(1.1408)	(1.0215)	(0.08540)	(0.0492)	(8.5381)	(0.0869)***	(0.0375)	(0.1029)***	(0.8928)	(0.0124)	8.5511
Number of countries	91	57	82	66	97	70	41	72	50	58	58
Number of observations	1001	509	565	274	313	723	180	652	285	319	565
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.06	0.30	0.22	0.45	0.26	0.81	0.78	0.10	0.83	0.57	0.72
Number of instruments	50	54	37	22	54	54	54	54	39	54	54
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.34	0.43	0.23	0.44	0.36	0.24	0.98	0.09	0.10	0.42	0.32

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Table 9: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including Exports (GMM)

Variable	United States	Japan	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Netherlands	Italy	Canada	Spain	Norway	Sweden
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.0483	-0.0052	0.0591	0.0652	0.0387	0.1855	0.1454	0.0738	0.1017	0.1411	0.1231
	(0.1425)	(0.1136)	(0.1114)	(0.1164)	(0.1141)	(0.0789)**	(0.1222)	(0.1112)	(0.1205)	(0.0973)	(01028)
Level ODA (*t* -1)	0.0001	-0.0010	0.0026	-0.0016	0.0031	0.0014	-0.0824	0.0065	0.0017	-0.2383	0.0149
	(0.0001)	(0.0005)**	(0.0008)***	(0.0159)	(0.0016)**	(0.0021)	(0.0340)***	(0.0021)***	(0.0005)***	(0.1675)	(0.0122)
Democracy (*t* -1)	1.4409	0.4779	1.1811	1.5373	2.3677	3.7870	2.1581	1.8386	1.4305	3.5517	4.1456
	(1.0300)	(2.2873)	(2.0501)	(2.1805)	(2.2344)	(2.5779)	(2.5506)	(2.0852)	(2.5184)	(2.7453)	(2.8268)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	1.4987	-0.1139	-0.3900	-0.1316	-0.4626	-0.5697	-0.4627	0.5446	-1.0348	0.2798	-0.6902
	(1.2954)	(0.9482)	(0.8089)	(1.1214)	(0.7427)	(0.9949)	(0.8167)	(0.8778)	(0.8881)	(1.1898)	(1.0494)
Exports (*t* -1)	-0.0005	-0.0005	-0.0006	-0.0017	-0.0084	0.0035	0.0048	-0.0090	-0.0025	-0.0019	0.0132
	(0.0001)***	(0.0003)*	(0.0026)	(0.0013)	(0.0071)	(0.0133)	(0.0042)	(0.0073)	(0.0059)	(0.0203)	(0.0178)
Number of countries	78	78	78	78	78	112	77	78	73	101	98
Number of observations	806	838	847	844	811	1400	751	826	707	1244	1220
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.18	0.74	0.99	0.64	0.89	0.12	0.85	0.60	0.63	0.03	0.18
Number of instruments	54	54	54	54	54	50	54	54	54	50	50
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.41	0.68	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.13	0.31	0.14	0.29	0.30	0.14

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Variable	Denmark	Australia	Belgium	Switzerland	Austria	Finland	Portugal	Ireland	Greece	Luxembourg	New Zealand
Voting coincidence (*t* -1)	0.2024	0.0747	0.1046	0.1226	-0.1073	0.0734	0.1511	-0.0272	0.0749	0.1064	-0.0200
	(0.0909)**	(0.1198)	(0.1485)	(0.1840)	(0.1599)	(0.1222)	(0.1478)	(0.1406)	(0.0852)	(0.1024)	(0.1483)
Level ODA (*t* -1)	-0.1013	-0.0925	-0.1754	0.1061	-0.1141	-2.5020	-0.5872	-2.3909	-0.1285	-1.1348	0.6634
	(0.0923)	(0.0743)	(0.2386)	(1.5939)	(0.2151)	(0.6981)***	(0.2143)***	(1.2824)*	(0.2371)	(1.6939)	(3.4021)
Democracy (*t* -1)	2.8779	-1.9757	-2.2472	4.2919	11.3539	0.9978	0.6552	1.6682	0.2304	14.0156	2.8907
	(2.6257)	(2.8955)	(4.1164)	(2.7631)	(4.6304)**	(3.0808)	(5.1009)	(2.3918)	(2.1623)	(5.0174)***	(3.5272)
National Capabilities (*t* -1)	0.4717	1.8425	0.0535	-0.4619	-0.0729	-0.2227	1.1129	0.2139	-2.8969	-0.2468	-0.4358
	(1.1358)	(2.0883)	(1.2947)	(1.1473)	(0.2756)	(0.8071)	(4.1734)	(0.9187)	(3.1303)	(1.2069)	(0.9426)
Exports (*t* -1)	-0.0210	1.7861	2.1372	-0.0001	-1.1159	-0.4081	0.2556	-0.0840	-1.2645	-0.0945	-0.0414
	(0.0189)	(0.3342)***	(1.1779)*	(0.0222)	(6.8445)	(0.0709)***	(0.1669)	(0.0258)***	(0.5368)**	(0.2687)	(0.0853)
Number of countries	91	57	82	66	97	70	41	72	50	58	55
Number of observations	1001	509	565	274	313	723	180	651	285	319	498
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.06	0.38	0.23	0.45	0.30	0.76	0.58	0.06	0.98	0.61	0.78
Number of instruments	50	54	37	22	54	54	54	54	39	54	54
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.34	0.22	0.18	0.44	0.33	0.23	0.95	0.04	0.10	0.45	0.35

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Table 10: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries, 5 Year Averages (GMM)

Variable	United States	Japan	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Netherlands	Italy	Canada	Spain	Norway	Sweden
Voting coincidence (t-1)	0.4993	0.3272	0.4248	0.4383	0.3914	0.4427	0.3497	0.5134	0.3574	0.4729	0.4701
	(0.1693)***	(0.1317)***	(0.1347)***	(0.1287)***	(0.1497)***	(0.1233)***	(0.1189)***	(0.1359)***	(0.1386)**	(0.1527)***	(0.1411)***
Level ODA (t-1)	0.0003	-0.0027	0.0086	0.0071	0.0119	0.0285	-0.1499	0.0095	0.0027	0.3122	0.0416
	(0.0002)**	(0.0013)**	(0.0023)***	(0.0188)	(0.0028)***	(0.0279)	(0.1890)	(0.0043)**	(0.0011)**	(0.4479)	(0.1782)
Democracy (t-1)	0.3982	0.6894	0.7131	0.5705	1.5776	0.5073	0.4162	0.5515	-0.1885	0.9335	-0.1558
	(1.1792)	(3.9027)	(3.0765)	(3.6315)	(3.3715)	(3.1699)	(3.7543)	(3.9182)	(3.9261)	(3.328)	(3.6291)
National Capabilities (t-1)	1.1234	0.6027	0.5748	0.2221	0.7663	0.3956	0.3536	0.2062	0.4377	0.1223	-0.2468
	(1.0805)	(0.4163)	(0.2687)**	(0.3504)	(0.3150)	(0.4005)	(0.3439)	(0.3761)	(0.3848)	(0.4069)	(0.5134)
Number of countries	96	98	97	98	98	136	95	98	90	119	19
Number of observations	318	328	329	329	328	497	318	330	284	433	429
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.58	0.50	0.28	0.23	0.53	039	0.20	0.20	0.29	0.40	0.11
Number of instruments	17	17	17	17	17	13	17	17	17	13	13
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.14	0.01	0.19	0.13	0.13	0.06	0.12	0.13	0.17	0.10	0.03

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

Variable	Denmark	Australia	Belgium	Austria	Finland	Portugal	Ireland	Greece	Luxembourg	New Zealand
Voting coincidence (t-1)	0.4493	0.2487	0.3953	0.6517	0.4235	0.2117	0.3753	0.8437	0.2489	0.3166
	(0.1616)***	(0.1554)	(0.1448)***	(0.1947)***	(0.1699)**	(0.1724)	(0.1134)***	(0.2507)***	(0.1470)*	(0.1499)**
Level ODA (t-1)	0.1717	0.3193	0.1648	0.2699	0.8504	1.3882	3.9970	0.2109	2.5814	0.4001
	(0.1742)	(0.4509)	(0.0579)***	(0.3097)	(1.3357)	(0.8162)*	(0.9727)***	(0.9863)	(2.0938)	(0.2347)*
Democracy (t-1)	1.0437	-1.8949	0.9191	0.1748	-3.8671	4.6568	-1.7366	2.2602	-0.5277	-3.9636
	(3.8318)	(3.2776)	(3.6327)	(3.9919)	(2.2367)	(7.6406)	(3.8983)	(5.4549)	(3.7741)	(2.5467)
National Capabilities (t-1)	0.7848	0.04542	0.4504	-0.2686	0.2650	0.4976	0.7143	0.7417	0.9400	0.4512
	(0.3844)	(0.3619)	(0.3143)	(0.4489)	(0.3697)	(0.5417)	(0.3571)	(0.5362)	(0.4084)	(0.3545)
Number of countries	105	77	96	124	92	51	89	65	88	71
Number of observations	356	224	310	374	288	108	272	121	257	227
Arellano-Bond test (p-value)	0.26	0.41	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.05	0.06	0.58	0.83	0.47
Number of instruments	13	17	17	17	17	17	17	14	17	17
Hansen J stat. (p-value)	0.36	0.42	0.12	0.06	0.12	0.60	0.29	0.32	0.29	0.22

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.

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Appendix 1

Variable description and source

Variable	Description	Source
Voting coincidence	Number of times a country votes the same as country X (either voting both yes, both voting no, both voting abstentions, or both being absent), divided by the total number of votes in each year.	United Nations Bibliographic Information System and author calculation
Level ODA	The annual amount of a DAC country's official development assistance as a proportion of the total official development assistance received by the recipient country	OECD's online database
Democracy	A dichotomous dummy variable classifying a country as a democracy (d=1) or not (d=0)	Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010)
National Capability	Composite indicator of national capability, based on total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure. This measure is generally computed by summing all observations on each of the 6 capability components for a given year, converting each state's absolute component to a share of the international system, and then averaging across the six components.	Correlates of War (COW) website (http://www.correlatesofwar.org)
GDPC	Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (constant 2008 USD)	World Development Indicators (World Bank)
Exports	Exports from DAC country X to aid recipient country as a percentage of recipient GDP	Direction of Trade Statistics (International Monetary Fund)
Imports	Imports from DAC country X to aid recipient country as a percentage of recipient GDP	Direction of Trade Statistics (International Monetary Fund)
GDP growth	Real Gross Domestic Product growth (annual percent)	World Development Indicators (World Bank)
External Debt	External debt stocks as a percentage of Gross National Income	World Development Indicators (World Bank)
AFPTL	Armed forces personnel as a percentage of the total labor force	World Development Indicators (World Bank)

Appendix 2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Standard Deviation	Observatioons
Voting Coincidence Australia (% times 100)	50.38	0	96.7	17.93	2703
Voting Coincidence Austria (% times 100)	54.35	0	100	18.17	2702
Voting Coincidence Belgium (% times 100)	50.97	0	98.7	17.69	2701
Voting Coincidence Canada (% times 100)	49.35	0	96.7	16.95	2703
Voting Coincidence Denmark (% times 100)	52.60	0	98.80	17.89	2702
Voting Coincidence Finland (% times 100)	52.41	0	100	17.98	2703
Voting Coincidence France (% times 100)	45.22	0	88.5	15.54	2703
Voting Coincidence Germany (% times 100)	51.44	0	98.81	18.03	2697
Voting Coincidence Greece (% times 100)	51.86	0	100	19.55	2703
Voting Coincidence Ireland (% times 100)	54.81	0	96.72	18.30	2681
Voting Coincidence Italy (% times 100)	52.17	0	98.81	17.94	2703
Voting Coincidence Japan (% times 100)	53.71	0	94.05	17.83	2701
Voting Coincidence Luxembourg (% times 100	51.53	0	100	17.81	2703
Voting Coincidence Netherlands (% times 100	51.26	0	98.81	17.82	2702
Voting Coincidence New Zealand (% times 10	57.27	0	95.08	18.12	2699
Voting Coincidence Norway (% times 100)	52.48	0	97.62	17.52	2701
Voting Coincidence Portugal (% times 100)	52.96	0	100	18.04	2703
Voting Coincidence Spain (% times 100)	53.51	0	100	17.90	2703
Voting Coincidence Sweden (% times 100)	54.15	0	96.43	18.02	2703
Voting Coincidence Switzerland (% times 100)	56.11	0	98.68	16.77	1081
Voting Coincidence United Kingdom (% times	44.69	0	93.42	16.22	2701
Voting Coincidence United States (% times 10	16.57	0	85.92	10.72	2703
Level ODA Australia (% times 100)	7.14	-12.5	121.99	17.27	1364
Level ODA Austria (% times 100)	0.80	-75.00	99.54	4.97	1959
Level ODA Belgium (% times 100)	1.38	-111.11	100	4.84	1877
Level ODA Canada (% times 100)	1.97	-1086.11	177.5	24.09	2278
Level ODA Denmark (% times 100)	1.73	-419.44	72.06	11.61	1534
Level ODA Finland (% times 100)	0.48	-55	20.83	2.10	1626
Level ODA France (% times 100)	8.93	-1963.89	402.49	44.63	2427
Level ODA Germany (% times 100)	6.30	-755.56	533.74	25.08	2426
Level ODA Greece (% times 100)	0.42	-0.41	25.7	1.56	957
Level ODA Ireland (% times 100)	0.63	-0.76	28.03	1.99	1461
Level ODA Italy (% times 100)	2.93	-37.04	424.94	14.09	1879
Level ODA Japan (% times 100)	12.11	-591.98	4541.67	94.67	2511
Level ODA Luxembourg (% times 100)	0.55	-4.24	17.18	1.38	1270
Level ODA Netherlands (% times 100)	1.12	-6655.56	322.59	145.29	2117
Level ODA New Zealand (% times 100)	1.50	-13.89	36.47	4.48	1345
Level ODA Norway (% times 100)	2.43	-372.22	56.55	9.55	1899
Level ODA Portugal (% times 100)	4.16	-8.33	100	11.58	574
Level ODA Spain (% times 100)	1.14	-5625	421.98	139.50	1717
Level ODA Sweden (% times 100)	1.65	-1061.11	57.22	24.60	1907
Level ODA Switzerland (% times 100)	0.95	-891.67	45.72	20.61	1903
Level ODA United Kingdom (% times 100)	3.11	-1472.22	233.27	35.98	2155
Level ODA United States (% times 100)	16.23	-2611	15958.33	344.56	2224
Democracy	0.47	0	1	0.50	2759
National Capability (% times 100)	0.37	0	19.86	1.41	2548
GDP Per Capita	3744.26	77.82	38569.23	5736.05	2597
GDP growth	4.02	-50.25	106.28	7.04	2610
External Debt	77.55	0.14	1031.38	94.74	2045
AFPTL	1.73	0	15	2.22	2509