Pothier, David (2012): Referral networks and the allocation of talent.
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We study a model of occupational choice where workers must rely on their social contacts to acquire job vacancy information. Contrary to the existing literature, we allow for worker heterogeneity in terms of their idiosyncratic skill-types. In this case, the allocation of talent (the matching of skills to tasks) becomes a welfare-relevant consideration. A worker’s skill-type determines both his relative cost of specialising in different occupations and his productivity on the job. The model shows that relying on word-of-mouth communication for job search generates both positive externalities (due to improved labour market matching) and negative externalities (due to a poor allocation of talent). Which effect dominates depends on the prop- erties of the job search and productivity functions. Taking into account worker heterogeneity shows that the degree of occupational segregation in competitive labour markets is generally not efficient.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Referral networks and the allocation of talent|
|Keywords:||Labour Markets; Social Networks|
|Subjects:||J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J0 - General > J01 - Labor Economics: General
Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J7 - Labor Discrimination > J70 - General
|Depositing User:||David Pothier|
|Date Deposited:||07. Jul 2012 00:38|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 14:48|
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