Kohler, Stefan (2012): More fair play in an ultimatum game after resettlement in Zimbabwe: A field experiment and a structural model.
Download (319Kb) | Preview
Zimbabwean villagers of distinct background have resettled in government organized land reforms for more than three decades. Against this backdrop, I assess the level of social cohesion in some of the newly established communities by estimating average preferences for fairness in a structural model of bounded rationality. The estimations are based on behavioral data from an ultimatum game field experiment played by 234 randomly selected households in six traditional and 14 resettled villages almost two decades after resettlement. In two out of three distinct resettlement schemes studied, the resettled villagers exhibit significantly higher degrees of fairness ($p ≤ 0.11$) and rationality ($p ≤ 0.04$) than those who live in traditional villages. Overall, villagers are similarly rational ($p = 0.30$) but the attitude toward fairness is significantly stronger in resettled communities ($p ≤ 0.01$). These findings are consistent with the idea of a raised need for cooperation required in recommencement.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||More fair play in an ultimatum game after resettlement in Zimbabwe: A field experiment and a structural model|
|Keywords:||Africa; behavioral economics; inequality aversion; land reform; impact evaluation; social change; social development; social preferences; structural estimation; quantal response model|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q1 - Agriculture > Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C93 - Field Experiments
|Depositing User:||Stefan Kohler|
|Date Deposited:||25. Jul 2012 14:27|
|Last Modified:||18. Feb 2013 09:20|
Anderson, S. P., Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (1998). A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games. Journal of Public Economics, 70, 297–323.
Barr, A. (2003). Trust and expected trustworthiness: Experimental evidence from Zimbabwean villages. The Economic Journal, 113, 614–630.
Barr, A. (2004a). Forging effective new communities: The evolution of civil society in Zimbabwean resettlement villages. World Development, 32, 1753–1766.
Barr, A. (2004b). Kinship, familiarity, and trust: An experimental investigation. In J. P. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. F. Camerer, E. Fehr, & H. Gintis (Eds.), Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies (pp. 305–334). Oxford University Press.
Barr, A., Wallace, C., Ensminger, J., Henrich, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., McElreath, R., Tracer, D., & Ziker, J. (2009). Homo Æqualis: A cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games. CSAE Working Paper Series, WPS/2009-0, 1–29.
Bauer, M., Cassar, A., Chytilová, J., & Henrich, J. (2012). Warfare experience during ontogeny increases egalitarian and parochial motivations. Paper presented at the United Nations University, Maastricht, Netherlands, (pp. 1–58).
Bellemare, C., Kröger, S., & Van Soest, A. (2008). Measuring inequity aversion in a heterogeneous population using experimental decisions and subjective probabilities. Econometrica, 76, 815–839.
Bellows, J., & Miguel, E. (2009). War and local collective action in Sierra Leone. Journal of Public Economics, 93, 1144–1157.
Blattman, C. (2009). From violence to voting: War and political participation in Uganda. American Political Science Review, 103, 231–247.
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review, 90, 166–193.
De Bruyn, A., & Bolton, G. E. (2008). Estimating the influence of fairness on bargaining behavior. Management Science, 54, 1774–1791.
Dekker, M. (2004a). Risk, resettlement and relations: Social security in rural Zimbabwe. In Tinbergen Institute Research Series No. 331. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis and Tinbergen Institute.
Dekker, M. (2004b). Sustainability and resourcefulness: Support networks during periods of stress. World Development, 32, 1735–1751.
Fearon, J. D., Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2009). Can development aid contribute to social cohesion after civil war? Evidence from a field experiment in post-conflict Liberia. American Economic Review, 99, 287–291.
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817–868.
Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (2000). Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in alternating-offer bargaining games. European Economic Review, 44, 1079–1089.
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., & Gintis, H. (2001). Societies in search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 91, 73–78.
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Henrich, N. S., Hill, K., Gil-White, F., Gurven, M., Marlowe, F. W., Patton, J. Q., & Tracer, D. (2005). "Economic man" in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 795–815; discussion 815–55.
Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2009). Field experiments and the political economy of development. Annual Review of Political Science, 12, 367–378.
Kohler, S. (2008). Inequality aversion and stochastic decision-making: Experimental evidence from Zimbabwean villages after land reform. In A. Innocenti, & P. Sbriglia (Eds.), Games, Rationality and Behavior: Essays on Behavioral Game Theory and Experiments (pp. 63–100). Bas¬ingstoke: Palgrave McMillan.
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995). Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 6–38.
Mckelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1998). Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games. Experimental Economics, 1, 9–41.
Offerman, T., Schram, A., & Sonnemans, J. (1998). Quantal response models in step-level public good games. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 89–100.
Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & Van De Kuilen, G. (2004). Differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis. Experimental Economics, 7, 171–188.
Owens, T., Hoddinott, J., & Kinsey, B. (2003). The impact of agricultural extension on farm production in resettlement areas of Zimbabwe. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 51, 337–357.
Scoones, I., Marongwe, N., Mavedzenge, B., Mahenehene, J., Murimbarimba, F., & Sukume, C. (2010). Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Myths and Realities. Woodbridge, Harare, Johannesburg: James Currey, Weaver Press, Jacana Media.
Voice of America (2009). Mugabe vows to continue Zimbabwe land reform. VOANews.com: Retrieved July 21, 2012, from http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-02-28-voa25.cfm.
Voors, M. J., Nillesen, E. E. M., Verwimp, P., Bulte, E. H., Lensink, R., & Soest, D. P. V. (2012). Violent conflict and behavior: A field experiment in Burundi. American Economic Review, 102, 941–964.
Wantchekon, L., & Guardado R., J. (2011). Methodology update: Randomised controlled trials, structural models and the study of politics. Journal of African Economies, 20, 653–672.
Yi, K.-O. (2005). Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game. Games and Economic Behavior, 51, 324–348.