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Valuation of 2G spectrum in India- A real option approach

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Abstract

The phenomenal growth of telecommunication sector in India has largely been possible due to the contributory factors such as the efforts made by private and public telecom service providers to make services affordable to the mass market, reduction in entry barrier due to drastically lowered entry level price for devices, changing demographic profile and the increasing per-capita income. However, it is the issue of spectrum pricing that has captured the centre stage with the high prices realized from the 3G and BWA spectrum auction and the outburst of the 2G Spectrum scam in India.

In this paper, we use both the traditional valuation method-Discounted Cash Flow as well as the Real Option approach that takes into consideration managerial flexibility and strategic decision making aspects. The analyses have been done individually as the factors determining revenues and thereby the spectrum values are expected to be different. By dividing the DCF or ROV value thus arrived by the total spectrum allotted so far in the service areas, we obtain the price of 1 MHz of spectrum. A sensitivity analysis has also been done to check the variations arising in the value due to changes in parameters like ARPU and subscriber count. Ignoring the economies of scale arising from usage of a larger block of spectrum, this value gives a reasonable estimate of the price of the spectrum that can be used by both companies and the government. The above analyses have been done to arrive at the price of 1 MHz of spectrum in each of the 22 telecom circles and also on a pan India level. The spectrum price range for a pan India 1 MHz of spectrum is Rs.1535 crores to Rs.1876 crores. This is definitely higher than the price discovered in 2001 – Rs.1658 crores for 6.2 MHz of spectrum. Finally, we also provide a comparison with the prices suggested by TRAI in its consulting paper.

1. Introduction

The last two decades have seen India emerging as one of the biggest telecom markets in the world. The Indian telecommunication sector in India is the third largest sector across the globe and the second largest among the emerging economies of Asia¹. This rapid growth has been possible due to various proactive and positive decisions of the Government and contribution of both the public and the private sector. The rapid strides in the telecom sector have been facilitated by liberal policies of the Government providing the telecom equipments an easy access to the market and a fair regulatory framework for offering telecom services to the Indian consumers at affordable prices. However, it is the issue of spectrum pricing that has captured the centre stage with the high prices realized from the 3G and BWA spectrum auction and the outburst of the 2G Spectrum scam.


With the recent cancellation of 122 license awarded in 2008 by the Supreme Court and the impending auction of spectrum, it is imperative for Companies to arrive at a price that they can pay to acquire a piece of the spectrum. Also, from a Government perspective, it is important to set a base price for the auction, given its objectives of overall benefit to the larger mass and maximization of Government revenues.

The number of telephone subscriber in India increased from 885.99 million at the end of Jun-11 to 906.93 million at the end of Sep-11, registering a growth of 2.36% over the previous quarter as against 4.69% during the QE Jun-11. This reflects year-on-year (Y-O-Y) growth of 25.39% over the same quarter of last year. The overall tele-density in India has reached 75.48 as on 30th September 2011².

¹ <http://ibef.org/industry/telecommunications.aspx>, accessed on 13/3/2012

² TRAI Performance Indicator Report, Sep 2011

Figure 1: Trends in Telephone subscribers and Teledensity in India




Source: TRAI

1.1.1 Indian Mobile Service

The Wireless segment is much larger than the Wireline segment in India. The segment is growing steadily because of the convenience and utility it offers. The subscriber base of Wireless services stood at 873.61 million as of September 2011 with tele-density of 72.70 percent.

Figure 2: Wireless Subscriber Base and Teledensity




Source: TRAI

Private players such as Bharti Airtel, Reliance, Vodafone, Tata, BSNL, and Idea Cellular cumulatively hold a major share of the Wireless market. There is a clear distinction between the Global Satellite Mobile Communication (GSM) and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technologies used within the Indian telecom sector. The industry is highly competitive


at present with over 10 service providers vying for the pie. This has ensured intense competition and continuously falling ARPU with the introduction of innovative schemes.

Figure 3: Subscribers by Company



Source: TRAI

Figure 4: Wireless Subscription: GSM vs CDMA



Source: TRAI

1.1.2 Near Saturation in Voice business

The voice business of Indian mobile services operators has seen a sharp decline in the past couple of years. The growth is expected to decelerate further, with active mobile penetration having hit ~56% (high given 37% Indians live below the poverty line) and Indian players having exploited price elasticity in the last 3-4 years (hyper-competition). After growing at about ~76%

CAGR over FY05-09, voice growth has slowed to 28% over FY09-11 and is likely to fall further to 12% in FY12³.

This is a structural shift in voice minutes and a build in volume growth of 8% for FY12-14E.

1.1.3 High Competition in the sector

The Indian wireless market has witnessed very high competition. Typically, the wireless market is an oligopoly of 3-5 players. However, the Indian telecom market has 14 operators with a Harfindahl index of less than 0.2. Although a recent Supreme Court order cancelling 122 licenses issued in January 2008 may reduce the number of players, competitive intensity is likely to remain high with at least 6-7 players with sizeable presence and/ or deep pockets.

1.2 Spectrum Allocation and Pricing

The Country is divided into 22 Service Areas consisting of 19 Telecom Circle Service Areas and 3 Metro Service Areas for providing Cellular Mobile Telephone Service (CMTS).

1.2.1 Supreme Court's Cancellation of 2G UAS license

The Supreme Court of India ordered all the 122 UAS licences issued in January 2008 following 2G spectrum auction. The companies whose licenses were scrapped are Uninor, Sistema Shyam, STel, Videocon, Idea Cellular, Tata Teleservices, Loop Telecom and Etisalat DB. These eight companies invested a total of INR 350-400 mn to acquire 2G license. The court also ordered Tata Teleservices, Unitech Wireless Group and Etisalat DB Telecom to pay INR 50 mn and Loop Telecom Ltd, S Tel Ltd, Allianz Infratech Ltd and Sistema Shyam Teleservices Ltd to pay INR 5 mn as fine each. The cancellation of licenses will release 470 MHz of 2G spectrum across India. Supreme Court also asked Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to prepare fresh recommendations within two months, to grant license and allocate 2G spectrums in 22 service areas via auction, similar to previous 3G auction.

1.2.2 DOT's recent Decisions

In future, the spectrum will not be bundled with the licence. The licence to be issued to telecom operators will be in nature of unified licence and the licence holder will be free to offer any of the multifarious telecom services. In the event the licence holder would like to offer wireless services, it will have to obtain spectrum through a market driven process.

In future, there will be no concept of contracted spectrum and, therefore, no concept of initial or start-up spectrum. Spectrum will be made available only through market driven process.

³ IDFC – Indian wireless sector report dated 2/3/2012

Additionally, assignment of balance of contracted spectrum may need to be ensured for existing licensees who have so far been allocated only the start up spectrum of 4.4 MHz. Only in respect of the licences that will be found valid after the process is completed, the additional 1.8 MHz will be assigned on their becoming eligible, but the spectrum will be assigned to them at a price determined under the new policy.

No more UAS licences linked with spectrum will be awarded. All future licences will be Unified Licences and allocation of spectrum will be delinked from the licence. Spectrum, if required, will have to be obtained separately. The prescribed limit on spectrum assigned to a service provider will be 2x8 MHz/2x5 MHz for GSM/CDMA technologies for all service areas other than in Delhi and Mumbai where it will be 2x10MHz/2x6.25MHz. However, the licensee can acquire additional spectrum beyond prescribed limits, in the open market, should there be an auction of spectrum subject to the limits prescribed for merger of licences.

In respect of spectrum obtained through auction, spectrum sharing will be permitted only if the auction conditions provide for the same. Spectrum trading will not be allowed in India, at this stage.

1.3 Spectrum Pricing

Given, the above scenario, we have attempted to price the spectrum. We do this by finding the value generated to a potential buyer/operator on acquiring this license. Since, value changes depending on the circle of operation; we have calculated the price of 1 Mhz of spectrum in Metros, Category A and Category B service areas.

2. Literature Review

In this section, we shall first look at the various attempts made to price the 2G telecom spectrum, specifically the consulting papers issued by TRAI and the responses from the telecom companies. Later, we look into how Real Option Valuation Approach is used in valuing assets.

In its report⁴ on value of spectrum in the 1800 Mhz Band, TRAI has proposed two methods for finding the economic value of spectrum, viz.

1. Cash Flow Method where the NPV of additional cash flows over a period of 20 years have been discounted to arrive at the suggested price.

⁴ TRAI Report on the 2010 Value of Spectrum in the 1800 Mhz Band dated 31 January 2011

2. The Substitution approach where the Cobb-Douglas function is used to arrive at the opportunity cost of spectrum which is treated as an input for supply of mobile services.

Most of the telecom companies have been critical of the suggested price arrived at by TRAI in the above consultation paper. Specifically, Plum Consulting in its report for Vodafone⁵ critically examines the shortcomings and also lists down some of the practices applied in some of the other countries in finding the spectrum price. The report talks about two approaches to pricing spectrum viz. Market Benchmarks and Bottom-up approaches. Given the drawbacks of Market Benchmarks, the focus is on the Bottom-up approach. The two approaches, as also used by TRAI, falling under this category are the DCF approach and the cost reduction value. The two approaches give a range of values for pricing the spectrum, the maximum value being determined by the DCF approach and the minimum value determined by the cost reduction approach.

Let us now look at the literature review of the DCF and the Real Options Approach.

Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation is the most common method to value real assets whose future cash flows can be forecasted with certain degree of predictability. The net present value of a project can be calculated by discounting the cash flows which are expected from the project at a certain discount rate which represents the risk of the project. This discount rate is weighted average cost of capital for a project whose risk matches the average risk of the projects of the firm. However if a project's risk differs considerably from the firm's average risk then the WACC is adjusted upwards or downwards to arrive at the new discount rate for the project depending on whether the project is more risky or less risky respectively (Brandao, Dyer, & Hahn, 2005).

DCF method is criticized for one of its inherent and structural weakness which is that the project's value will remain same and unaffected despite any future decisions by the management of the firm or the project (Brandao, Dyer, & Hahn, 2005). As a project runs through its useful life a manager might want to bring about some changes and depart from the original plan of action. Such departure from the initially conceived plan of action is not represented adequately by the DCF model which assumes that the investments are made at predetermined time intervals. We can incorporate Monte-Carlo analysis to vary the shape of the probability distribution of the actual investment; however we can't change the time at which that investment will be made.

⁵ Plum Consulting report titled "Methodologies for Valuing Spectrum: Review of the Experts' Report", dated 1 March 2011

Consider an investment where a pharmaceutical company invests in the trial of a new drug, if the trial is successful the company will launch the new drug in the market if it is not then the company would stop further research and development in this new drug. Though this is a pretty straight forward scenario where the financial manager can incorporate decision tree analysis to evaluate the scenario, however actual problems in real life can be very different and in such cases instead of investing all capital upfront a more strategic investment plan might be the need.

Some of the examples of project flexibilities are (Branda, Dyer, & Hahn, 2005),


- Expanding operations in response to affirmative response from the market
- Deferring a particular investment or abandoning it completely if it underperforms
- Scaling down the project in case the project has reached a maturity state and the returns have hit the cap.

As the uncertainty in various facets of long term and strategic investments increases Real options will find broad application as a strategic tool. Leslie and Michaels (Leslie & Michaels, 1997) discuss some of the fundamental differences that exist between the traditional discounted cash flow valuation (DCF) and the Real option valuation using Black Scholes & Merton options theory.

They argue that traditional methods like DCF ignore the value of flexibility and strategic decision making and hence they tend to ignore the additional value embedded in investment opportunities where the investment is irreversible and constitutes a huge cost to the company (Leslie & Michaels, 1997). Real option methodology empowers the management to capture the value of this flexibility (Alleman, 2002).

DCF methodology assumes that the capital investment decision is a one-time decision, however when a high amount of capital is involved such huge investment decisions are rarely taken in one go and rather they are strategic decisions and receive a continuous feedback from the limited execution of the project and market forces (Leslie & Michaels, 1997).

Figure 5: Differences between Net Present Value & Real Options Valuation Approach



(Leslie & Michaels, 1997)

Mkhize & Moja in their research discuss the application of real options valuation technique in the cellular telecommunications industry in South Africa (Mkhize & Moja, 2009). They discuss about the evaluation of investment that managers in the telecommunication industry of South Africa might have to make in the next generation technologies.

Investment in the next generation technology incorporates a fair degree of uncertainty and real options theory using Black Scholes method and Binomial models have been found effective while making capital budgeting decisions (Mkhize & Moja, 2009).

Cellular operators are often required to take complex decisions regarding whether to deploy a new technology or keep using the existing one. The sources of volatility while doing capital budgeting decision analysis are the volatile demand of the customer, high initial expenditure and a threat of a new and a better technology.

They calculate the total investment value of the new project as the sum of the passive Net present value (which is the base case discounted cash flow analysis) plus the option value which arises from various strategic opportunities that managers might encounter during the course of the project. They conclude that the value of the project is much more than that calculated using a traditional DCF as a premium was added to it in the form of option value.

Another application of real options valuation technique is explained by Basili & Fontini in their valuation of the 3G license in the United Kingdom (Basili & Fontini, 2003). They calculated the aggregate option value of the 3G licenses which were auctioned in UK in the year 2000.

Telecommunications industry is considered to be one of the central bones of the economy and the application of auction to allocate 3G airwaves to various bidders is considered to be one of the most effective economic paradigms of a real life problem (Basili & Fontini, 2003).

The revenues which were generated in the auction exceeded the government's initial estimate by a far greater amount. Though the government received a windfall in the auction process the operators were tied down under huge debt burden and within 2 years after the auctions European telecommunication firms started doubting the ability of an auction to maximize the total surplus and not just the government's surplus. The stocks of the firms which had bid for the license performed badly after the auctions which led analysts to believe that the market is discounting the future earnings of these firms at a higher discount rate because of the perceived risk because of heavy debt burden (Basili & Fontini, 2003).

The option value of the license is calculated in the article and it has been shown that the value of the project roughly corresponds to the value of the fees extracted from the bidders (Basili & Fontini, 2003).

It is widely believed that the telecommunication firms in the Europe lost a lot market value because of the perceived high price paid for the 3G spectrum, nonetheless, a real option valuation shows that the value extracted from the project is approximately equal to the value paid for the licenses.

The loss in value of the telecom firms could not be explained on the basis of the high prices paid for the license, instead the authors brings in the discussion of a very crucial aspect of the 3G technology which is the killer application that is required to get the users hooked to your network and hence resulting in a higher ARPU. In the absence of such applications and difficulties regarding the handset (Access Device) and the general downward trend in the Economic scenario were given as the probably reasons for the loss in value. They also mentioned that over a long term such as 20 years which is also the term of the license such effects might not remain that relevant and eventually the technology might take off (Basili & Fontini, 2003). Logically too, these possibilities are taken care of by the real options methodology inherently because of the incorporation of the volatility of the future cash flows as an input in the valuation model and hence the added value.

Another recent literature in this field tries to evaluate the value of the transferability value of the telecommunication license. The driver behind such kind of research is the fact that in most of the nation when government allots a telecommunication license it also stipulates that the license could not be transferred to another telecom operators. Stipulation like the one mentioned above might cause inconvenience to the customers and hence removal of the option is the best solution in such cases. When removal is considered there is an added value to the original license and hence an option is embedded in the original license which should be valued to arrive at the final price of the license (Mastroeni & Naldi, 2010).

In most of the countries when the government assigns the telecommunication licenses to various firm, they also set out certain time bound conditions like rollout etc. In case a company is not able to achieve its target within the stipulated time, the government might reassign the spectrum but that would take a lot of time and resources. If the government allows reselling of the spectrum the bidders would look at this as an embedded option in the license which gives them an option to exit the project in case it doesn't suit their operations. This also will increase the value of the license at the time of the auction (Mastroeni & Naldi, 2010).

In their paper Stille, Limme and Brandao analyze the real option methodology in the Decision making process in the Telecommunication Industry. They study the 3G license auctions which allocated 3G spectrums to various operators who wish to operate 3G mobile services in Brazil (Stille, Lemme, & Brandao, 2010). They had calculated 64% premium on the license when the value of the license was calculated using Real options methodology as compared to discounted cash flow methodology.

The degree of similarity that they brought forward between a license and auction so as to justify their methodology of following real options valuation is (Stille, Lemme, & Brandao, 2010),

- There are a large number of factors which make the investment in the rollout of the mobile services a strategic investment which needs to be managed actively as against a passive investment. This gives rise to a volatility which is adequately taken into consideration in a Real options methodology.
- The acquisition of the license gives the operator the right and not the obligation to invest in the rollout of 3G services. The operator can decide to invest at a small scale and then based on the market expectations and expected future demand it may decide to scale up its investment. In short timing of the decision to undertake an irreversible financial decision is very important.

- The third characteristic of the license that increases its option value and thus justifying the use of real options methodology is that the license represents a strong barrier to entry from the competition and hence increases the value of the option.

The methodology that they follow is a pretty straightforward one. They follow the following sequence (Stille, Lemme, & Branda, 2010),

- Calculate the static NPV of the asset which in this case is license. NPV is calculated using expected level of cash flows generated from the license and the WACC.
- In the next step they calculate the volatility of the returns of the project.
- Once they had the volatility they proceeded to the option valuation step.

So far we have discussed the advantages of real option valuation methodology versus the discounted cash flow valuation methodology; we then discussed some of the relevant literature exploiting the importance of real option valuation methodology.

Though real options have wide applications across various Capital investment decision situations practitioners do get bogged down by the higher mathematics involved in the real options valuation theory. A simple framework which could be applied to various practical situations and is backward compatible with the Discounted Cash Flow valuation method and valuation sheets is provided by Luehrman in an article in *Harvard Business Review* (Luehrman, 1998).

Though the framework is not that effective when the analysis requires absolute precision however it gives a good starting point to analyze strategic decision making under uncertainty. On top of giving a good head start the valuation and insights that the framework provides are definitely better than the base case DCF analysis. Luehrman draws an analogy between an investment opportunity before a company to a call option as the organization has a right to invest but is not under the obligation to do so. Luehrman considers the case of a European Call Option and then he tries to map the parameters of the investment opportunity over the parameters of the European Call Option (Luehrman, 1998). The mapping is displayed in the graphic below.

3. Methodology

This research attempts to find the value of the 2G spectrum in each of the service areas under Metros, Category A and Category B which could serve as a basis for the upcoming auction. To calculate the value of the 2G spectrum allotment, it has been considered as a project and then we

have tried to calculate the value of 1 MHz of spectrum block for which the methodology has been explained below,

- A discounted cash flow analysis has been done on the expected earnings (cash-flows) which would accrue in a service area from 2G operations, considering the current level of revenues. The DCF analysis serves as the base case for our real option valuation purpose and some of the outputs which would be generated in the process of doing DCF would be used to calculate the option value of the project. The projections and assumptions used for estimating the future earnings/cash-flows are explained in a later chapter.
- Sensitivity analysis is done on the NPV obtained from the DCF model to see the risk associated with the project.
- Real option valuation is the last step in the valuation process to calculate the value of the option. The model which is used is explained in a further section.

3.1 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation

Under the purview of discounted cash flow valuation the following two methods are used,

- *Net Present Value Method.* Under NPV method, net present value of the company is calculated by discounting the cash flows from a project at a risk adjusted rate of return. NPV is the difference of the present value of cash inflows from the project and the present value of the investment overlay that will go into the project.

$$NPV = \sum_{n=0}^{n=T} \frac{C_n}{(1+R)^n}$$

Where,

T – Useful life of the project

R – Risk adjusted discount rate of the project

C_n – Net Cash flow in period ' n ' inclusive of investment outlays

The above equation could be re-written as,

$$NPV = S - K$$

Where,

S – Net present value of the cash inflows from the project

K – Net present value of the investment overlay for the project

The figure thus arrived gives the value of spectrum. However, the price charged to the operator must allow a reasonable rate of return on their investment. We have taken the value to be 20%⁶. The shadow price of spectrum to be charged is then calculated using the formula.

$$\text{Value} = \text{Price} + NPV \text{ over 20 years of (Price * 20\%)}$$

Though we discussed the disadvantages of the DCF valuation in the previous section, just to reiterate, the main disadvantage of using NPV method is aptly highlighted by (Brandao, Dyer, & Hahn, 2005) contending that NPV method doesn't take into consideration managerial flexibility and hence strategies like “wait and see” and “pilot project” can't be taken into account while valuing the project.

Since DCF valuation will serve as a base case scenario we will first try to calculate the NPV of the project before doing a real option valuation.

3.2 Real Option Valuation

We will now discuss the model that we will use to calculate the value of the real option. For calculating the value we will use the Black-Scholes model (Damodaran, 2000),

$$ROV = S \cdot e^{-qt} \cdot N(d_1) - K \cdot e^{-r_f t} \cdot N(d_2)$$

$$d_1 = \frac{\ln\left(\frac{S}{K}\right) + (r_f - y + \sigma^2)t}{\sigma\sqrt{t}}$$

$$d_2 = d_1 - \sigma\sqrt{t}$$

⁶ TRAI Report on the 2010 value of Spectrum in the 1800 MHz Band

Where,

Parameter	In context of Real Option	In context of Financial Option
S	Present Value of cash flows expected from the project	Stock Price
q	Opportunity Cost of not Expanding (Explained Below)	Dividend Yield
T	Expected Competitive Advantage Period/Rights for Expansion	Time to Expiration
r_f	Risk free rate of return on 10 year GOI bond	Risk free rate of return
K	Present Value of Capital Costs	Strike Price
$(\sigma)^2$	Volatility of Project Value	Volatility of Return on Stock

$N(d_1)$ & $N(d_2)$ are normal cumulative distributions which gives us the range of the likelihood of the real option being viable before expiration date.

In the context of current project the real option is the option to operate, expand and upgrade their 2G systems for the incumbent operators.

The inputs used in the above model are explained below,

1. S – Present value of cash flows is calculated from the assumptions explained in the previous section and the output from DCF model is used as input in this model.
2. K – Present value of capital expenditure required to rollout 2G services. Considering that most of the operators have already installed the required active infrastructure, this is the opportunity cost of holding the infrastructure or the amount required to buy it from another operator.
3. q – Opportunity cost of waiting and not rolling out 2G services. Although we have calculated the cash flows for each year, it is difficult to predict the exact pattern of cash flows which would be lost by waiting to roll out 2G services. To overcome this problem we have assumed a dividend yield of 5%. Since useful life of the project is 20 years, 5% of the value of the present value of cash flows could be considered as the dividend payments which we would not receive in case we don't rollout 2G services immediately. The other cost of waiting is the loss of market to competition which once lost is difficult to recapture.

4. t – This is the time period over which the option should be exercised lest the telecom operators will lose competitive edge. On top of that TRAI has set certain rollout obligations which involve covering 90% of the metro areas and 50% of DHQs within 2 years of allotment of 2G license which effectively translates the expansion of 2G services by a company as a series of call options. However we are taking an approximation here that the telecom operators need to rollout the 2G services within 2 years.

5. r_f – Risk free rate on 10 year GOI. The yield on 10 year GOI bond is 7.94% in March⁷.

6. σ – Volatility of project is difficult to estimate and theoretically a Monte-Carlo analysis needs to be done with all relevant probability distributions of the input variables. Since we don't have the relevant probability distribution we have used annualized standard deviation of returns of Bombay Stock Exchange Technology, Media and Telecom Index (BSE TECK) as a proxy which is equal to ~28%.

4. Data & Assumptions

The data for the purpose of valuation has been taken from public sources and sector reports. Data has also been estimated for some of the years by taking assumptions. We will now discuss various data points and assumptions. We will take the example of Maharashtra to show the assumptions used. Assumptions for all the other states can be found in the Appendix.

4.1 Revenue Projections

To calculate future revenues and cash-flows it becomes important for us to look at the drivers of the revenue. In telecommunication industry the important metrics which are looked at are the number of subscribers and the average revenue per user (*ARPU*).

$$\text{Revenue} = \text{ARPU} \times \text{Number of Subscribers}$$

Now we have two variables to forecast on the basis of above equation. We will look into them one by one. Since, we have both GSM and CDMA operators in a service area, we further split into $\text{Revenues}_{\text{GSM}}$ and $\text{Revenues}_{\text{CDMA}}$

$$\text{Revenues}_{\text{GSM}} = \text{ARPU}_{\text{GSM}} \times \text{Subs}_{\text{GSM}}$$

And,

$$\text{Revenues}_{\text{CDMA}} = \text{ARPU}_{\text{CDMA}} \times \text{Subs}_{\text{CDMA}}$$

⁷ <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/Government-Bond-Yield.aspx?Symbol=INR>, accessed on

4.2 Average Revenue per User (ARPU)

The ARPU figures have been taken from the quarterly performance report published by TRAI.

Figure 6: GSM Metro ARPU Trend




Figure 7: GSM Category-A ARPU Trend




Figure 8: GSM Category-B ARPU Trend





Figure 9: GSM Category-C ARPU Trend



These trends indicate a flattening out of ARPU. Similar trends are observed in CDMA operators also. Going forward, ARPUs are expected to remain stable, as have been covered in various sector reports⁸. Even TRAI, in its valuation of 1800 Mhz spectrum assumes a flat ARPU⁹. For our valuation, we assume that ARPUs fall by 1% in each service area in the next 2 years and remain stable thereafter.

4.3 Subscriber Count

The subscriber count which had been growing at a huge pace has slowed down due to increased penetration and saturation. Going forward the growth rate is expected to drop and remain stable. In this paper, for GSM, we have used Dec'11 monthly growth rate to find the annualized growth. Over time, we assume that the growth rates would stabilize to 2% per annum. In case of CDMA,

⁸ IDFC-Indian wireless sector report dated 2/3/12

⁹ TRAI Report on 2010 value of spectrum in the 1800 MHz Band, dated Jan 30, 2011

most of the states have experienced very low rated of around 2%-4% and some even negative, we have assumed a flat rate of 2% growth rate.

Figure 10: GSM Service Area wise Subscriber Growth Rate

Service Area	Monthly	Annualized
Andhra Pradesh	4.2%	18%
Assam	5.6%	24%
Bihar	3.5%	15%
Delhi	1.9%	8%
Gujarat	3.4%	14%
Haryana	4.8%	21%
Himachal Pradesh	5.6%	24%
Jammu & Kashmir	-0.3%	-1%
Karnataka	2.1%	9%
Kerala	3.8%	16%
Madhya Pradesh	3.1%	13%
Maharashtra	4.3%	18%
Mumbai	1.1%	5%
North East	4.7%	20%
Orissa	4.8%	21%
Punjab	4.0%	17%
Rajasthan	3.2%	13%
Tamil Nadu	2.8%	12%
UP(E)	2.1%	9%
UP(W)	4.1%	17%
Kolkata	2.6%	11%
West Bengal	2.5%	10%

4.4 Capital Expenditure

Capital expenditure in Indian telecom industry can be broadly divided into two segments,

1. Investment in Passive Infrastructure – Investment in passive infrastructure is not done by telecom companies instead there are separate companies like Reliance Infratel and Indus Towers who create passive infrastructure and then rent it out to various telecom companies.
2. Investment in Active Infrastructure – Telecom companies have to install their Base Transceiver Stations (BTS) to rollout 2G services. The number of BTS installed during the rollout phase shall determine our Capital Expenditure. Other costs include the cost of core network.

The number of BTS installed again depends on the number of subscribers and the type of technology (GSM or CDMA). We get the number of BTS required in each service area by dividing the total number of subscribers in a service area by the Subs per BTS figure.

The number of subscribers supported by a BTS has been calculated by TRAI. For GSM, numbers corresponding to 6.2 Mhz have been taken as this represents the contracted spectrum recommended by TRAI. Similarly for CDMA, numbers corresponding to 5 Mhz have been considered.

Figure 11: GSM Mobile Subscriber Density which can be served with 6.2 MHz

Inter Site Distance (in Metre)	Sq KM Per BTS	BTSs per Sq KM	Traffic per BTS	Subs per BTS	Subs per Sq Km	Total no. of subs. Which can be served
300	0.08	12.81	39.3	983	12596	35989
400	0.14	7.21	39.3	983	7085	20244
500	0.22	4.64	39.3	983	4535	12956
600	0.31	3.21	39.3	983	3149	8997
700	0.42	0.42	39.3	983	2314	6610
800	0.55	0.55	39.3	983	1771	5061
1000	0.87	0.87	39.3	983	1134	3239

Source: TRAI

The total capital expenditure in each service area is thus obtained by multiplying cost of a BTS by the number of BTS required

Figure 12: CDMA Mobile Subscriber Density which can be served with 5 MHz

Inter Site Distance (in Metre)	Sq KM Per BTS	BTSs per Sq KM	Traffic per BTS	Capacity for 3 sector	Total Capacity with 70% loading	Subs per BTS	Subs per Sq Km	Total no. of subs. Which can be served
700	0.42	2.35	104	312	218.4	5460	12857	51429
1000	0.87	1.15	104	312	218.4	5460	6300	25200
1200	1.25	0.8	104	312	218.4	5460	4375	17500
1500	1.95	0.51	104	312	218.4	5460	2800	11200
2000	3.47	0.29	104	312	218.4	5460	1575	6300
2500	5.42	0.18	104	312	218.4	5460	1008	4032
3000	7.8	0.13	104	312	218.4	5460	700	2800
3500	10.62	0.09	104	312	218.4	5460	514	2057

Source: TRAI

Figure 13: Capital Expenditure

Item	Cost (Rs.)
Capex per BTS	600000

4.5 Operating Expenditure

The breakup of the operating expenses for a typical telecom operator in India has been taken from a report prepared by FICCI in which they had given the industry wide cost structure with various heads.

Figure 14: Operating Cost Structure in Typical GSM operator in India

Expense Head	Percentage	Driver
Net Interconnection Charges as % of Gross Revenues	20%	Gross Revenue
Network Operating Expenses	15%	Net Revenue
Sales & Distribution Expenses	7%	Net Revenue
IT Expenses	2%	Net Revenue
Service Expenses	3%	Net Revenue
Billing, Collection and Bad Debt	2%	Net Revenue
Marketing Expenses	3%	Net Revenue
Personnel Administration	5%	Net Revenue
Total Operating Expenses	37%	Net Revenue
Spectrum Usage Charge as % of AGR	4%	Net Revenue

Source: FICCI Report

4.6 Financing of Capital Expenditure and License Fees

Capital expenditure has been assumed to be paid up front. For financing we have assumed a debt equity ratio of 1. For the purpose of valuation we have kept financing separate from the project and have assumed that the industry will tend to maintain the debt and equity in the same ratio. The debt equity ratio is taken as the average debt equity ratio of 3 telecom operators for the last 4 years as shown in figure below.

Figure 15: Average Debt Equity Ratio of Telecom Operators

Debt Equity Ratio					
Company	2008	2009	2010	2011	Average
Bharti Airtel	0.47	0.33	0.28	0.14	0.305
Idea Cellular	1.95	1.84	0.67	0.57	1.2575
Reliance Communications	0.71	0.82	0.6	0.48	0.6525
Average					0.738

Source: Moneycontrol

4.7 Depreciation & Amortization

For depreciation of capital expenditure and amortization of license fees a period of 20 years has been considered and straight line method has been assumed.

4.8 Cost of Capital

Weighted average cost of capital is calculated using the following formula,

$$WACC = K_e \times W_e + K_d \times W_d \times (1 - t)$$

Where,

K_e – Cost of Equity (Calculated from CAPM)

K_d – Cost of Debt (Assumed to be 9.5%)

W_e – Weight of Equity in Capital Structure

W_d – Weight of Debt in Capital Structure

T – Tax Rate (Assumed to be 30%)

For calculating Cost of Equity, Market Return on Nifty is calculated in 2010 CY. Risk free rate of return is considered as yield on 10 Year GOI bonds which is 7.94% in March. These values have then been substituted in Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM),

$$K_e = R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

Where,

β – This is measure of systematic risk of the project.

R_f – Risk free rate of return

R_m – Rate of return on market

For calculating β two methods have been considered,

1. Median beta of telecom companies has been taken.
2. Beta of a portfolio of stocks of telecom companies have been taken with weights of each stock being equal to their weight in the combined market capitalization.

The two methods are illustrated in figure below.

Figure 16: Calculation of Beta

Company (Stock)	Beta	Market Capitalization (Crore)	Weight in Portfolio
Bharti Airtel	0.69	130103	69%
Idea Cellular	0.99	30762	16%
Reliance Communications	1.6	19309	10%
MTNL	1.19	1950	1%
TATA Communications	0.5	6708	4%
Median Beta	0.99		
Portfolio Beta	0.83		

Source: Reuters

WACC calculations are shown in the figure below.

Figure 17: Cost of Capital Calculations

Debt-Equity Ratio	0.99
<i>Weight of Debt</i>	0.50
<i>Weight of Equity</i>	0.50
Cost of Debt	9%
Tax Rate	30%
Effective Cost of Debt	6%

Cost of Equity Calculations

Risk Free Rate on 10 Year GOI Bond	8.45%
Market Return	17%
Beta	1.06
Cost of Equity	17.86%

<i>Cost of Capital</i>	12.11%
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5. Results

In this chapter first the base case DCF valuation results are presented along with the sensitivity analysis of key variables. After the DCF valuation, real option value of the license has been given which is calculated on the basis of Chapter 4 & 5. The results shown are for Maharashtra service area. Result for other service areas can be found in the Appendix.

5.1 DCF Valuation

5.1.1 NPV

The value of 1 MHz of spectrum is obtained by dividing the DCF value obtained for Maharashtra by the total amount of spectrum allotted so far¹⁰.

We then calculated the shadow price of spectrum using the methodology given in chapter 5.

It is found out to be **Rs. 1077.4 mn or 107.74 crores**.

This is the price that an operator might be willing to pay for 1 MHz of spectrum in Maharashtra and should be considered while deciding whether to operate in a service area or not.

5.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis

From the understanding of the DCF model, there are many critical factors which decide the outcome of the DCF and hence they need to be checked for the variance that can be seen in case the base assumptions are not met. These critical parameters have been selected as Subscriber adjustment factor and ARPU adjustment factor, amount of capital invested and cost of capital.

Subscriber adjustment factor is important parameter as this decides the number of mobile users which in turn affects the revenues. Similarly ARPU adjustment factor has a direct bearing on the revenues.

Like in any project, cost of capital plays an important role in the values derived from the project (starting 2G telecom operations). Also, since capital investment in infrastructure is a direct outflow of cash, it too has an impact on the value.

¹⁰ TRAI Recommendation on Spectrum Management and Licensing Framework, dated 11 May 2010

Figure 18: Sensitivity analysis using subscriber and ARPU adjustment factor

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor						
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	1207	1379	1552	1724	1897	2069	2242
	0.8	1156	1321	1486	1651	1816	1981	2146
	0.9	1104	1262	1420	1578	1736	1893	2051
	1.0	1053	1204	1354	1505	1655	1805	1956
	1.1	1002	1145	1288	1431	1574	1717	1861
	1.2	951	1086	1222	1358	1494	1630	1765
	1.3	899	1028	1156	1285	1413	1542	1670

Figure 19: Sensitivity analysis using Cost of Capital and Capital Investment

		Capital Investment Factor						
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
Cost of Capital	10%	294	242	202	171	145	124	107
	11%	285	233	193	162	136	115	98
	12%	277	224	184	153	127	106	88
	13%	268	216	175	144	118	97	79
	14%	259	207	167	135	109	88	70

5.2 Real Option Valuation

The value of the Real option was calculated according to the variables as explained in 4th chapter and has been given below:

Figure 20: Real Option Value of 1 MHz in Maharashtra

Parameters	Value
S (Bn)	216.258
K (Bn)	99.677
r _f	8.45%
Q	5%
t (years)	2
Σ	28%
Output	Value
D1	2.33
D2	1.93
N(D1)	99.005%
N(D2)	97.334%
1 MHz value (mn)	1324.6

This is the option price of 1 MHz of spectrum as it gives the operator the option to start its telecom operation. The price takes into account the managerial flexibility and hence is higher than that arrived using the DCF approach.

5.3 Comparison Spectrum value using DCF and ROV approach

A comparison of values obtained for service areas under Category A, Category B and Metros is shown below. The higher values arrived using ROV approach is due to the consideration of managerial flexibility.

Figure 21: DCF and ROV valuation of 1 MHz spectrum

Service Area	Price of 1 MHz Spectrum (Rs. Mn)	
	DCF Approach	ROV Approach
Andhra Pradesh	1505	1818
Delhi	1244	1479
Gujarat	960	1174
Haryana	286	365
Karnataka	1009	1218
Kerala	852	1026
Madhya Pradesh	652	809
Maharashtra	1077	1325
Mumbai	782	932
Punjab	602	732
Rajasthan	700	856
Tamil Nadu	1465	1776
UP(E)	900	1116
UP(W)	603	766
Kolkata	341	420
West Bengal	423	555
Himachal Pradesh	111	139
Bihar	639	802
Orissa	274	350
Assam	386	465
North East	246	296
Jammu & Kashmir	290	345
Total	15348	18761

6. Conclusion and Recommendation

The motivation behind this research was to find the intrinsic and option value of the spectrum, 1 MHz in unit in service areas under Metros, Category A and Category B. This achieves greater significance in the light of cancellation of licenses by the Supreme Court and the impending spectrum auction.

The values for spectrum arrived using ROV approach were higher than those arrived using the DCF approach. In other words we can say that Real option analysis has allowed us to look at the option value embedded in the 2G spectrum allotment. This flexibility in the hands of the managers is not adequately represented with a DCF analysis where in the timing of the investment should be known/predicted beforehand. However such kind of information and knowledge is rarely available at the time of planning and moreover in projects with high degree of uncertainty and with irreversible investments. Real options analysis adequately captures this flexibility and hence it results in higher valuation for the aggregate 2G spectrum. It would be prudent for an operator to consider the two values as a range within which it can purchase 2G spectrum. It is also recommended that in future while allocating telecom licenses or licenses in sectors where high and irreversible investment is required and there is a scope for the licensees to invest in phases or in modules, the government should consider real options methodology for setting the price of the license, or the base price of the licenses in case the government decides to follow an auction methodology to allocate the licenses to determine a more accurate price of the license which takes into account the managerial flexibility.

The spectrum price range therefore for a pan India 1 Mhz of spectrum is Rs.1535 crores to Rs.1876 crores. This is definitely higher than the price discovered in 2001 – Rs.1658 crores for 6.2 Mhz of spectrum. However, we do not distinguish between the prices for initial spectrum assignment and incremental spectrum assignment.

TRAI in its consultation paper in February has suggested 7 models for pricing the spectrum¹¹. As per the above models the price varies from Rs.620.48 crores (SBI PLR method) to Rs.3350.12 crores (3G auction price). The suggested price for spectrum beyond 6.2 Mhz is Rs.4571.85 crores. Comparing these prices with the values derived in this paper clearly suggest that the high prices suggested by TRAI may be detrimental to the Indian telecom sector.

¹¹ TRAI consultation paper on Auction of Spectrum dated 7 March 2012

7. References

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8. APPENDIX

8.1 Maharashtra

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

8.2 Andhra Pradesh

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

8.3 Gujarat

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor								
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3			0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	346	396	445	495	544	594	643	Cost of Capital	10%	202	166	138	115	97	82	70
	0.8	455	520	585	650	715	780	845		11%	195	159	130	108	90	75	62
	0.9	564	644	725	805	886	966	1047		12%	188	151	123	101	83	68	55
	1.0	672	768	864	960	1056	1152	1248		13%	181	144	116	93	75	60	48
	1.1	781	892	1004	1115	1227	1338	1450		14%	174	137	109	86	68	53	40
	1.2	889	1016	1143	1270	1397	1524	1651									
	1.3	998	1140	1283	1425	1568	1710	1853									

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor								
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3			0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	452	516	581	645	710	775	839	Cost of Capital	10%	240	198	165	140	119	101	87
	0.8	573	655	737	819	901	983	1065		11%	233	190	158	132	111	94	80
	0.9	697	796	896	995	1095	1195	1294		12%	225	183	150	124	103	87	73
	1.0	822	939	1056	1174	1291	1408	1526		13%	217	175	142	117	96	79	66
	1.1	947	1082	1217	1353	1488	1623	1758		14%	210	167	135	109	89	73	59
	1.2	1072	1226	1379	1532	1685	1838	1992									
	1.3	1198	1369	1540	1712	1883	2054	2225									

8.4 Karnataka

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

8.5 Tamil Nadu

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor								Capital Investment Factor								
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1	1.1	1.2	1.3		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	707	808	909	1010	1111	1211	1312	Cost of Capital	10%	363	301	254	217	187	162	140
	0.8	884	1010	1136	1263	1389	1515	1641	11%	353	291	244	207	177	152	131	
	0.9	1063	1215	1367	1518	1670	1822	1974	12%	343	281	234	197	167	142	121	
	1.0	1243	1420	1598	1776	1953	2131	2308	13%	333	271	224	187	157	132	112	
	1.1	1423	1627	1830	2033	2237	2440	2643	14%	323	261	214	177	147	123	103	
	1.2	1604	1833	2062	2292	2521	2750	2979									
	1.3	1785	2040	2295	2550	2805	3060	3315									

8.6 Delhi

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor								Cost of Capital	Capital Investment Factor							
	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3			
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	288	330	371	412	453	494	536	258	219	189	165	145	129	115		
	0.8	386	288	288	288	288	288	288	254	215	184	160	141	124	111		
	0.9	483	288	288	288	288	288	288	249	210	180	156	136	120	106		
	1.0	580	288	288	288	288	288	288	245	206	175	151	132	115	102		
	1.1	677	288	288	288	288	288	288	240	201	171	147	127	111	97		
	1.2	775	288	288	288	288	288	288									
	1.3	872	288	288	288	288	288	288									

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Cost of Capital	Capital Investment Factor						
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	500	571	643	714	786	857	928	303	258	223	195	172	153	137
	0.8	640	500	500	500	500	500	500	298	253	218	190	167	148	132
	0.9	783	500	500	500	500	500	500	293	248	213	185	162	143	127
	1.0	927	500	500	500	500	500	500	289	243	208	180	157	139	123
	1.1	1073	500	500	500	500	500	500	284	238	203	175	153	134	118
	1.2	1219	500	500	500	500	500	500							
	1.3	1365	500	500	500	500	500	500							

8.7 Mumbai

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

8.8 Kolkata

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor							
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	118	135	152	168	185	202	219	10%	77	63	52	44	37	31	26
	0.8	158	181	203	226	249	271	294	11%	74	60	49	41	34	28	23
	0.9	199	227	255	284	312	340	369	12%	71	57	47	38	31	25	21
	1.0	239	273	307	341	376	410	444	13%	68	54	44	35	28	22	18
	1.1	279	319	359	399	439	479	519	14%	65	52	41	32	25	20	15
	1.2	320	365	411	457	502	548	594								
	1.3	360	412	463	514	566	617	669								

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor							
		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	158	181	203	226	248	271	293	10%	91	75	63	53	45	39	33
	0.8	202	231	260	289	318	347	376	11%	88	72	60	50	42	36	30
	0.9	248	283	319	354	390	425	461	12%	85	69	57	47	39	33	27
	1.0	294	336	378	420	462	504	546	13%	82	66	54	44	36	30	25
	1.1	341	389	438	487	535	584	633	14%	79	63	51	41	34	27	22
	1.2	387	443	498	553	609	664	719								
	1.3	434	496	558	620	682	744	806								

8.9 Kerala

8.10 Punjab

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor							
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	225	257	289	321	353	385	417	10%	116	95	79	66	56	47	40
	0.8	290	332	373	415	456	498	539	11%	112	91	75	62	51	43	36
	0.9	356	407	458	508	559	610	661	12%	108	87	70	58	47	39	32
	1.0	421	482	542	602	662	722	783	13%	104	83	66	54	43	35	27
	1.1	487	557	626	696	765	835	904	14%	100	78	62	49	39	31	23
	1.2	553	631	710	789	868	947	1026								
	1.3	618	706	795	883	971	1060	1148								

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor							
		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	288	329	370	411	452	493	534	10%	138	113	95	80	68	58	50
	0.8	362	413	465	517	568	620	672	11%	133	109	90	75	63	54	46
	0.9	437	499	561	624	686	749	811	12%	129	104	86	71	59	50	42
	1.0	512	585	659	732	805	878	951	13%	124	100	81	67	55	46	38
	1.1	588	672	756	840	924	1008	1092	14%	120	96	77	63	51	42	34
	1.2	664	759	854	949	1043	1138	1233								
	1.3	740	846	951	1057	1163	1269	1374								

8.11 Haryana

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor								
	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3		
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	80	91	103	114	125	137	148	10%	62	49	39	31	24	19	14
	0.8	120	137	154	171	189	206	223	11%	59	45	35	27	20	15	11
	0.9	160	183	206	229	252	275	297	12%	55	42	32	23	17	11	7
	1.0	200	229	258	286	315	343	372	13%	52	38	28	20	13	8	3
	1.1	241	275	309	344	378	412	447	14%	48	35	25	16	10	4	0
	1.2	281	321	361	401	441	481	521								
	1.3	321	367	413	458	504	550	596								

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor								
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3		
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	126	144	162	180	198	216	234	10%	75	60	48	39	31	25	21
	0.8	167	191	215	239	263	287	311	11%	71	56	44	35	28	22	18
	0.9	211	241	271	301	331	361	391	12%	68	52	41	32	25	19	15
	1.0	255	292	328	365	401	438	474	13%	64	49	37	29	22	17	13
	1.1	301	344	387	430	472	515	558	14%	60	45	34	26	19	15	11
	1.2	347	396	446	495	545	594	644								
	1.3	393	449	505	561	617	673	729								

8.12 Uttar Pradesh (W)

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor									Capital Investment Factor							
	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7		0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3		
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	171	195	220	244	269	293	318	10%	140	112	90	73	59	47	37	
	0.8	255	291	327	364	400	437	473	11%	133	105	83	65	51	40	30	
	0.9	338	387	435	483	532	580	628	12%	126	97	75	58	44	32	22	
	1.0	422	482	542	603	663	723	784	13%	119	90	68	51	37	25	15	
	1.1	506	578	650	722	794	867	939	14%	112	83	61	44	29	18	8	
	1.2	589	673	758	842	926	1010	1094									
	1.3	673	769	865	961	1057	1153	1250									

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor									Capital Investment Factor							
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	266	304	342	380	418	456	494	10%	169	136	110	91	75	62	51	
	0.8	352	403	453	504	554	604	655	11%	161	128	103	83	68	55	45	
	0.9	443	506	570	633	696	759	823	12%	153	120	95	76	61	49	39	
	1.0	536	613	689	766	842	919	996	13%	146	113	88	69	54	43	34	
	1.1	631	721	811	901	991	1081	1171	14%	138	106	81	63	48	37	29	
	1.2	726	830	934	1038	1141	1245	1349									
	1.3	822	940	1057	1175	1292	1410	1527									

8.13 Uttar Pradesh (E)

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor								
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3			0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	298	341	384	426	469	511	554	Cost of Capital	10%	208	169	140	117	98	82	69
	0.8	409	467	526	584	643	701	760		11%	199	161	132	108	89	73	60
	0.9	520	594	668	742	817	891	965		12%	191	153	123	100	81	65	52
	1.0	630	720	810	900	990	1081	1171		13%	183	145	115	92	72	57	43
	1.1	741	847	953	1059	1164	1270	1376		14%	175	136	107	83	64	48	35
	1.2	852	973	1095	1217	1338	1460	1582									
	1.3	962	1100	1237	1375	1512	1650	1787									

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor								
		1	1	1	1	1	1	1			0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	411	470	529	587	646	705	763	Cost of Capital	10%	2030	1957	1884	1812	1739	1668	1597
	0.8	531	607	683	759	835	911	987		11%	1835	1761	1686	1612	1539	1466	1395
	0.9	655	749	842	936	1030	1123	1217		12%	1661	1585	1509	1434	1360	1288	1217
	1.0	781	893	1004	1116	1227	1339	1451		13%	1505	1428	1351	1276	1201	1129	1059
	1.1	908	1038	1167	1297	1427	1557	1686		14%	1366	1287	1210	1134	1060	988	919
	1.2	1036	1184	1331	1479	1627	1775	1923									
	1.3	1164	1330	1496	1662	1828	1995	2161									

8.14 Rajasthan

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor						
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	253	289	325	361	397	433	469
	0.8	332	379	426	474	521	569	616
	0.9	411	470	528	587	646	704	763
	1.0	490	560	630	700	770	840	910
	1.1	569	651	732	813	894	976	1057
	1.2	648	741	834	926	1019	1112	1204
	1.3	728	832	935	1039	1143	1247	1351

		Capital Investment Factor						
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
Cost of Capital	10%	155	128	107	90	77	66	56
	11%	150	123	102	85	72	60	51
	12%	145	118	97	80	66	55	45
	13%	140	113	91	75	61	50	40
	14%	135	107	86	69	56	44	35

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor						
		1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	329	376	424	471	518	565	612
	0.8	418	478	537	597	657	716	776
	0.9	508	581	653	726	798	871	944
	1.0	599	685	770	856	941	1027	1112
	1.1	690	789	888	986	1085	1184	1282
	1.2	782	894	1005	1117	1229	1341	1452
	1.3	874	998	1123	1248	1373	1498	1623

		Capital Investment Factor						
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
Cost of Capital	10%	185	153	129	109	94	80	70
	11%	179	147	123	104	88	75	64
	12%	173	142	117	98	82	69	59
	13%	168	136	112	92	77	64	54
	14%	162	130	106	87	72	59	49

8.15 Madhya Pradesh

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor									Capital Investment Factor							
	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7		0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3		
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	215	246	276	307	338	368	399	10%	151	123	102	85	71	59	50	
	0.8	296	338	380	422	464	507	549	11%	145	117	96	78	65	53	43	
	0.9	376	430	484	537	591	645	699	12%	139	111	89	72	58	47	37	
	1.0	457	522	587	652	718	783	848	13%	133	105	83	66	52	41	31	
	1.1	537	614	691	768	844	921	998	14%	127	99	77	60	46	35	25	
	1.2	618	706	795	883	971	1059	1148									
	1.3	699	798	898	998	1098	1198	1297									

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor									Capital Investment Factor							
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	297	340	382	425	467	510	552	10%	180	148	123	103	87	74	63	
	0.8	385	440	495	550	605	660	715	11%	173	141	116	97	81	68	57	
	0.9	475	543	611	679	746	814	882	12%	167	135	110	90	75	62	51	
	1.0	567	647	728	809	890	971	1052	13%	160	128	104	84	69	56	46	
	1.1	659	753	847	941	1036	1130	1224	14%	154	122	97	78	63	51	41	
	1.2	752	859	967	1074	1182	1289	1396									
	1.3	845	966	1087	1207	1328	1449	1569									

8.16 West Bengal

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor							
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	98	112	126	140	154	168	182	10%	109	86	68	55	43	34	26
	0.8	164	187	211	234	258	281	304	11%	102	80	62	48	37	27	19
	0.9	230	263	296	329	362	395	427	12%	96	73	56	42	30	21	13
	1.0	296	339	381	423	466	508	550	13%	90	67	49	35	24	14	6
	1.1	363	414	466	518	570	621	673	14%	83	61	43	29	17	8	0
	1.2	429	490	551	612	674	735	796								
	1.3	495	566	636	707	778	848	919								

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor							
		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	183	210	236	262	288	314	340	10%	131	105	85	69	56	46	38
	0.8	248	283	319	354	390	425	460	11%	125	98	78	63	50	41	33
	0.9	317	362	407	453	498	543	588	12%	118	92	72	57	45	35	28
	1.0	388	444	499	555	610	666	721	13%	111	85	66	51	40	31	24
	1.1	462	528	594	660	726	792	858	14%	105	79	60	46	35	26	20
	1.2	537	613	690	767	843	920	997								
	1.3	612	700	787	875	962	1050	1137								

8.17 Himachal Pradesh

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor							
		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	10%	26	21	17	14	12	10	8
	0.8	49	56	63	70	77	85	92	11%	25	20	16	13	11	9	7
	0.9	63	73	82	91	100	109	118	12%	24	19	15	12	9	7	6
	1.0	78	89	100	111	122	133	144	13%	22	18	14	11	8	6	5
	1.1	92	105	118	131	144	158	171	14%	21	16	13	10	7	5	3
	1.2	106	121	136	152	167	182	197								
	1.3	120	137	155	172	189	206	223								

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

		Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor							
		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	50	57	64	71	79	86	93	10%	31	25	21	17	15	12	10
	0.8	65	75	84	93	103	112	121	11%	30	24	20	16	13	11	9
	0.9	81	93	104	116	127	139	150	12%	28	23	18	15	12	10	8
	1.0	97	111	125	139	152	166	180	13%	27	22	17	14	11	9	7
	1.1	113	129	146	162	178	194	210	14%	26	20	16	13	10	8	6
	1.2	130	148	167	185	204	222	241								
	1.3	146	167	188	209	229	250	271								

8.18 Bihar

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor									Capital Investment Factor							
	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7		0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3		
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	197	225	253	281	309	337	365	10%	150	122	99	82	68	56	46	
	0.8	280	320	360	400	440	480	520	11%	144	115	93	75	61	49	39	
	0.9	364	416	468	520	572	624	676	12%	137	108	86	68	54	42	32	
	1.0	448	511	575	639	703	767	831	13%	130	101	79	61	47	35	25	
	1.1	531	607	683	759	835	911	986	14%	123	94	72	55	40	28	18	
	1.2	615	703	790	878	966	1054	1142									
	1.3	698	798	898	998	1098	1197	1297									

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor									Capital Investment Factor							
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	286	327	368	409	450	491	532	10%	2030	1957	1884	1812	1739	1668	1597	
	0.8	375	429	482	536	589	643	696	11%	1835	1761	1686	1612	1539	1466	1395	
	0.9	467	534	601	667	734	801	868	12%	1661	1585	1509	1434	1360	1288	1217	
	1.0	561	642	722	802	882	962	1042	13%	1505	1428	1351	1276	1201	1129	1059	
	1.1	657	750	844	938	1032	1126	1220	14%	1366	1287	1210	1134	1060	988	919	
	1.2	753	860	968	1075	1183	1290	1398									
	1.3	849	971	1092	1213	1334	1456	1577									

8.19 Orissa

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

8.20 Assam

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor									Capital Investment Factor							
	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7		0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3		
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	153	174	196	218	240	262	283	10%	81	67	57	49	42	37	32	
	0.8	192	219	247	274	301	329	356	11%	79	65	55	47	40	34	30	
	0.9	231	264	297	330	363	396	429	12%	76	63	53	45	38	32	28	
	1.0	270	309	347	386	424	463	502	13%	74	61	51	42	36	30	26	
	1.1	309	353	398	442	486	530	574	14%	72	59	48	40	34	28	23	
	1.2	348	398	448	498	548	597	647									
	1.3	388	443	498	554	609	664	720									

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor									Capital Investment Factor							
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7		0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3		
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	190	217	244	271	298	326	353	10%	95	80	68	58	51	44	39	
	0.8	235	268	302	335	369	403	436	11%	93	77	65	56	48	42	37	
	0.9	280	320	360	400	440	480	520	12%	91	75	63	54	46	40	34	
	1.0	325	372	418	465	511	558	604	13%	88	73	61	51	44	37	32	
	1.1	371	424	477	530	583	635	688	14%	86	71	59	49	41	35	30	
	1.2	416	476	535	594	654	713	773									
	1.3	461	527	593	659	725	791	857									

8.21 North East

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor							Capital Investment Factor									
	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3		
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	98	112	126	140	154	168	182	Cost of Capital	10%	51	43	36	31	27	23	20
	0.8	123	140	158	175	193	210	228	11%	50	41	35	30	26	22	19	
	0.9	147	168	189	210	231	252	274	12%	49	40	34	28	24	21	18	
	1.0	172	197	221	246	270	295	319	13%	47	39	32	27	23	19	16	
	1.1	197	225	253	281	309	337	365	14%	46	38	31	26	22	18	15	
	1.2	221	253	285	316	348	379	411									
	1.3	246	281	316	352	387	422	457									

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

8.22 Jammu & Kashmir

Cost of 1 MHz of spectrum (Rs. mn)

DCF Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor								Cost of Capital	Capital Investment Factor							
	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.7	0.8	0.9
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	125	143	161	179	197	215	232	Cost of Capital	58	49	42	37	32	28	25	
	0.8	151	173	194	216	237	259	281		57	48	41	36	31	27	24	
	0.9	177	202	228	253	278	304	329		56	47	40	35	30	26	23	
	1.0	203	232	261	290	319	348	377		55	46	39	34	29	25	22	
	1.1	229	262	295	327	360	393	425		54	45	38	33	28	24	21	
	1.2	255	292	328	364	401	437	474									
	1.3	281	321	361	402	442	482	522									

Real Option Sensitivity Analysis

	Subscriber Adjustment Factor								Cost of Capital	Capital Investment Factor							
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	
ARPU Adjustment Factor	0.7	151	172	194	215	237	258	280	Cost of Capital	68	57	49	43	38	34	30	
	0.8	181	207	233	258	284	310	336		67	56	48	42	37	33	29	
	0.9	211	241	271	301	332	362	392		66	55	47	41	36	32	28	
	1.0	241	276	310	345	379	413	448		64	54	46	40	35	31	27	
	1.1	271	310	349	388	426	465	504		63	53	45	39	34	30	26	
	1.2	301	345	388	431	474	517	560									
	1.3	332	379	426	474	521	569	616									