Halkos, George and Papageorgiou, George (2012): Simple taxation schemes on non–renewable resources extraction.
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Traditional economic theory, up to the middle of the twentieth century, builds up the production functions regardless of the inputs’ scarcity. In the last few decades it has become clear that in many cases inputs are depletable quantities and at the same time a lot of constraints are imposed in their usage in order to ensure economic sustainability. Furthermore, the management of exploitation and use of natural resources (either exhaustible or renewable) has been discussed by analyzing dynamic models applying methods of Optimal Control Theory. This theory provides solutions that are concerned with a single decision maker who can control the model’s dynamics facing a certain performance index to be optimized. In this paper we consider some simple taxation schemes based both on price charged and on the stock size as well. As the feedback taxation rules are more efficient than the other (non feedback) rules we have constructed the simple taxation scheme and found the analytical expression of the tax function.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Simple taxation schemes on non–renewable resources extraction|
|Keywords:||Non-renewable resources; differential games; Markov equilibrium|
|Subjects:||Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q30 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
|Depositing User:||G.E. Halkos|
|Date Deposited:||30. Aug 2012 09:05|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 08:35|
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