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Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism

Tian, Guoqiang (1991): Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism. Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics , Vol. 22, No. 2 (1993): pp. 169-179.

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Abstract

This paper investigates the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations for public goods economies when initial endowments are private information and unreported endowments are consumed (withheld) but are not destroyed. It will be noted that the mechanism presented here is individually feasible, balanced, and continuous. Besides, we allow preferences of agents to be nontotal-nontransitive and discontinuous.

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