Tian, Guoqiang (1991): Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence without Continuous, Convex, and Ordered Preferences. Published in: Social Chioce and Welfare , Vol. 9, (1992): pp. 117130.

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Abstract
This paper consideres the problem of designing better mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with constrained Walrasian allocations for nonneoclassical economies under the minimal possible assumptions. We show that no assumprions on preferences are needed for feasible and continuous implementation of the constrained Walraisan correspondence. Further, under the monotonicity assumption, we present a mechanism that is completely feasible and continuous. Hence, no continuity and convexity assumptions on preferences are required, and preferences may be nontotal or nontransitive. Thus, this paper gives a somewhat positive answer to the question raised in the literature by showing that, even for nonneoclassical economies, there are incentivecompatible, privacy preserving, and wellbehaved mechanisms which yield Paretoefficient and individually rational allocations at Nash equilibria.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence without Continuous, Convex, and Ordered Preferences 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Walrasian Correspondence; Convex; Ordered Preferences 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D5  General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium 
Item ID:  41298 
Depositing User:  Guoqiang Tian 
Date Deposited:  19. Sep 2012 11:38 
Last Modified:  18. Feb 2013 03:39 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/41298 