Isaac, Alan G (2006): Social Consequences of Commitment.
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This paper begins with a detailed computational introduction to a classic ACE model: an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma. The paper presents a simple but fully coded object oriented implementation of this model. (We use the Python programming language, which is shown to be a natural ally for ACE research). Using these tools, we demonstrate that player type evolution is affected by cardinal payoffs. We then explore a possible social benefit to commitment, where 'commitment' denotes an unwillingness to surrender a reciprocal strategy.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Social Consequences of Commitment|
|Keywords:||ACE; agent-based; computational economics; iterated prisoner's dilemma; evolutionary prisoner's dilemma; commitment|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C63 - Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
|Depositing User:||Alan G Isaac|
|Date Deposited:||12. Oct 2006|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 20:49|