Social Consequences of Commitment

Isaac, Alan G (2006): Social Consequences of Commitment. Unpublished.

Abstract

This paper begins with a detailed computational introduction to a classic ACE model: an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma. The paper presents a simple but fully coded object oriented implementation of this model. (We use the Python programming language, which is shown to be a natural ally for ACE research). Using these tools, we demonstrate that player type evolution is affected by cardinal payoffs. We then explore a possible social benefit to commitment, where 'commitment' denotes an unwillingness to surrender a reciprocal strategy.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: ACE; agent-based; computational economics; iterated prisoner's dilemma; evolutionary prisoner's dilemma; commitment
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming > C63 - Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling