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Incentives, Supervision and Regulation of Microfinance Institutions in the developing countries

Founanou, Mathurin and Ratsimalahelo, Zaka (2012): Incentives, Supervision and Regulation of Microfinance Institutions in the developing countries.

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Abstract

We analyze the optimal regulation of a MFI that has private information on the intrinsic quality of its loan portfolio (adverse selection) and where the MFI’s choice of effort to improve this quality cannot be observed by the regulator (moral hazard). In designing optimal contracts the regulator faces a tradeoff between inducing proper incentives for efficient MFI and costs of regulation in terms of leaving an informational rent for a high quality MFI. We identify conditions for the optimal incentive contract and show that, not surprisingly, these contracts depend on the accuracy of the supervisor’s signal, the likelihood of facing a high quality MFI, and the cost of supervision. However, since improving the accuracy of supervision is costly, even in the optimal monitoring scheme there generally exists a positive probability of MFI failure. The content of information disclosure is characterized by the optimal monitoring scheme.

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