Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Monopolistic Location Choice in Two-Sided Industries

Böhme, Enrico and Müller, Christopher (2012): Monopolistic Location Choice in Two-Sided Industries.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_41761.pdf

Download (116Kb) | Preview

Abstract

We analyze the optimal location choice of a monopolistic firm that operates two platforms on a two-sided market. We show that the optimal platform locations are equivalent to the one-sided benchmark if both sides are either restricted to single- or multi-homing. In the mixed case (one side single-homes, the other one multi-homes), the optimal platform locations are determined by the relative profitability of both market sides. Our results indicate that modeling mergers on two-sided markets with fixed locations is often inappropriate.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.