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Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes

Duddy, Conal (2012): Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes.

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Abstract

We consider two no-show paradoxes, in which a voter obtains a preferable outcome by abstaining from a vote. One arises when the casting of a ballot that ranks a candidate in first causes that candidate to lose the election. The other arises when a ballot that ranks a candidate in last causes that candidate to win. We show that when there are at least four candidates and when voters may express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet's principle must generate both of these paradoxes.

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