Imperfect information in a quality-competitive hospital market. A comment on Gravelle and Sivey

Shelegia, Sandro (2012): Imperfect information in a quality-competitive hospital market. A comment on Gravelle and Sivey.

Abstract

I show that the equilibrium derived in Gravelle and Sivey (2010) cannot hold for rational consumers. I then partially characterize the continuum of possible equilibria for rational consumers.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Quality choice, imperfect information
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

References

Bagwell, Kyle, “Commitment and Observability in Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 8 (2), 271–280. Gravelle, Hugh and Peter Sivey, “Imperfect information in a quality-competitive hospital market,” Journal of Health Economics, July 2010, 29 (4), 524–535. Maggi, Giovanni, “The Value of Commitment with Imperfect Observability and Private Information,” RAND Journal of Economics, Winter 1999, 30 (4), 555–574. Shelegia, Sandro, “Quality Choice of Experience Goods,” 2011.