Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Abbink, Klaus and Dasgupta, Utteeyo and Gangadharan, Lata and Jain, Tarun (2012): Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes.

Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Basu (2011) advocates legal immunity for bribe-givers, while retaining culpability for bribe-takers. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the positive disciplining effect of such an implementation. As a result, asymmetric liability on its own may face challenges in the field.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: harassment bribes; experiment; asymmetric penalty; retaliation
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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