Bloch, Francis and Hege, Ulrich (2003): Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests.
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We consider the allocation of corporate control in a company with two large and a continuum of small shareholders. Control is determined in a shareholders' meeting, where the large shareholders submit competing proposals in order to attract the vote of small shareholders. The presence of multiple shareholders reduces private benefits through competition for control. In the optimal ownership structure, the more efficient blockholder will hold just enough shares to gain control, but a large fraction of shares is allocated to the less efficient shareholder in order to reduce rents. We investigate when the large shareholders would want to trade parts or all of their share blocks among them, and show that the concern about retrading will lead to a larger than optimal stake of the controlling shareholder.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests|
|Keywords:||Multiple shareholders, corporate control, contestability, block trading|
|Subjects:||G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
|Depositing User:||Ulrich Hege|
|Date Deposited:||31. Oct 2012 12:11|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 19:17|
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