Democratization and civil war

Armey, Laura E. and McNab, Robert M. (2012): Democratization and civil war.

Abstract

We examine the impact of civil war on democratization. Using a theoretical bargaining model, we hypothesize that prolonged violence, war termination, the presence of natural resources, and international intervention influence democratization. We test these hypotheses using an unbalanced panel data set of 96 countries covering a 34-year period. We determine that civil war lowers democratization in the succeeding period. This finding appears to be robust to conditioning, different instrument sets, and the measurement of democracy. In addition, we observe evidence that external intervention increases democratization.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Civil War; Democracy; Conflict; Democratization; Outcomes of War
• Subjects: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War; N - Economic History > N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation > N40 - General, International, or Comparative

References

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., & Yared, P. (2008). Income and Democracy. The American Economic Review, 98(3), 808.

Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., & Yared, P. (2005). From Education to Democracy? American Economic Review, 95(2), 44–49. doi:10.1257/000282805774669916

Acemoglu, Daron, & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (First ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297. doi:10.2307/2297968

Arena, P., & Hardt, B. (2011, April). Incentives to Rebel, Bargaining, and Civil War. Working Paper.

Aslaksen, S. (2010). Oil and democracy: More than a cross-country correlation? Journal of Peace Research, 47(4), 421 –431. doi:10.1177/0022343310368348

Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restriction in dynamic panel data models. Jounal of Econometrics, 87, 11–143.

Brancati, D., & Snyder, J. L. (2011). Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature Postconflict Elections. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(3), 469 –492. doi:10.1177/0022002711400863

Castelló-Climent, A. (2008). On the distribution of education and democracy. Journal of Development Economics, 87(2), 179–190. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.10.006

Chauvet, L., & Collier, P. (2009). Elections and economic policy in developing countries. Economic Policy, 24(59), 509–550. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2009.00228.x

Chen, S., Loayza, N. V., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2008). The Aftermath of Civil War. The World Bank Economic Review, 22(1), 63 –85. doi:10.1093/wber/lhn001

Collier, P. (2008). The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Oxford University Press, USA.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2005). Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 625–633. doi:10.1177/0022002705277551

Cronin, B. (2010). Be careful what you wish for: War aims and the construction of postwar political orders. Journal of Peace Research, 47(6), 791 –801. doi:10.1177/0022343310381621

Csordás, S., & Ludwig, M. (2011). An empirical investigation of the determinants of democracy: Trade, aid and the neighbor effect. Economics Letters, 110(3), 235–237. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.12.006

Derouen, K. R., & Bercovitch, J. (2008). Enduring Internal Rivalries: A New Framework for the Study of Civil War. Journal of Peace Research, 45(1), 55 –74. doi:10.1177/0022343307084923

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis. The American Political Science Review, 94(4), 779.

Epstein, D. L., Bates, R., Goldstone, J., Kristensen, I., & O’Halloran, S. (2006). Democratic Transitions. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 551.

Fortna, V. P. (2004). Does Peackeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War. International Studies Quarterly, 48, 269–292.

Fortna, V. P., & Huang, R. (2009, November). Democratization After Civil War. Working Paper. Retrieved from http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/research.htm

Gleditsch, K. S. (2002). All International Politics Is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization. University of Michigan Press.

Gurses, M. (2011). Elites, Oil, and Democratization: A Survival Analysis*. Social Science Quarterly, 92(1), 164–184. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2011.00762.x

Gurses, M., & Mason, T. D. (2008). Democracy Out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post-Civil-War Democracy. Social Science Quarterly, 89(2), 315–336. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2008.00534.x

Hausman, J. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica, 46(6), 1251–1271. doi:10.2307/1913827

Heid, B., Langer, J., & Larch, M. (2012). Income and democracy: Evidence from system GMM estimates. Economics Letters, 116(2), 166–169. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.02.009

Heston, A., Summers, R., & Aten, B. (2011). Penn World Table Version 7.0. Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania,. Retrieved from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php

Hoddie, M., & Hartzell, C. A. (2010). Strengthening Peace in Post-Civil War States: Transforming Spoilers Into Stakeholders. University of Chicago Press.

Jensen, N., & Wantchekon, L. (2004). Resource wealth and political regimes in Africa. Comparative Political Studies, 37(7), 816.

Joshi, M. (2010). Post-civil war democratization: promotion of democracy in post-civil war states, 1946–2005. Democratization, 17(5), 826–855. doi:10.1080/13510347.2010.501173

Karl, T. L. (1999). The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty. Journal of International Affairs, 53(1), 32–48.

Levine, R., & Renelt, D. (1992). A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions. The American Economic Review, 82(4), 942–963.

McBride, M., Milante, G., & Skaperdas, S. (2011). Peace and War With Endogenous State Capacity. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(3), 446 –468. doi:10.1177/0022002711400862

Perotti, R. (1996). Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say (Journal of Economic Growth) (pp. 149–87). Springer. Retrieved from http://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jecgro/v1y1996i2p149-87.html

Roodman, D. (2008, May). A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments. Center for Global Development. Retrieved from http://www.cgdev.org/files/14256_file_Instruments.pdf

Rosendorff, B. P. (2001). Choosing Democracy. Economics and Politics, 13(1), 1–29. doi:10.1111/1468-0343.00081

Ross, M. (2001). Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, 53(3), 325–361.

Ross, M. (2006). A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. Annual Review of Political Science, 9(1), 265–300. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.081304.161338

Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (1999). The big push, natural resource booms and growth. Journal of Development Economics, 59(1), 43.

Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review, 45(4-6), 827.

Sarkees, M. R., & Wayman, F. (2010). Resort to War: 1816-2007. CQ Press. Sen, A. (2000). Development as Freedom (Reprint.). Anchor.

Walter, B. F. (2001). Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton University Press.

Wantchekon, L. (2004). The Paradox of “Warlord” Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation. The American Political Science Review, 98(1), 17.

Wooldridge, J. M. (2001). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (1st ed.). The MIT Press.