Carbonai, Davide and Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni (2006): Interlocking directorates as a thrust substitute: The case of the Italian non-life insurance industry.
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This paper investigates the market structure of the insurance business by analyzing the (interlock) linkages among companies created by their directors. We focus on the non-life business since this is a sector relatively closed with respect to the competition with other financial activities; an absence of industry competition cannot thus be compensated by other agents. We apply the graph theory to describe the network and the principal component analysis to summarize information and verify the correlation between direct interlocking and companies’ market shares.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Institution:||University of Teramo|
|Original Title:||Interlocking directorates as a thrust substitute: The case of the Italian non-life insurance industry|
|Keywords:||Non-life insurance; antitrust; competition; interlocking directorates; network economics|
|Subjects:||K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K21 - Antitrust Law
K - Law and Economics > K0 - General
|Depositing User:||Giovanni Di Bartolomeo|
|Date Deposited:||11. Aug 2007|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 10:48|
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