Koray, Semih and Saglam, Ismail (1997): Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets. Unpublished.
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We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among all oligopolistic regulatory models, where Bayesian approach is indispensable.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Institution: | Bilkent University |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Bayesian Implementation; Nash Implementation; Asymmetric Information; Oligopoly; Regulation |
| Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L50 - General |
| ID Code: | 4459 |
| Deposited By: | Ismail Saglam |
| Deposited On: | 13. Aug 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 28. Jul 2011 16:05 |
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