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On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors

Oyama, Daisuke and Tercieux, Olivier (2005): On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors.

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Abstract

This paper studies the impact of a small probability event on strategic behavior in incomplete information games with non-common priors. It is shown that the global impact of a small probability event (i.e., its propensity to affect strategic behavior at all states in the state space) has an upper bound that is an increasing function of a measure of discrepancy from the common prior assumption. In particular, its global impact can be arbitrarily large under non-common priors, but is bounded from above under common priors. These results quantify the different implications common prior and non-common prior models have on the (infinite) hierarchies of beliefs.

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